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Non-technical executive summary 
The present study constitutes the final report of the CaDoVaC (Capital Dynamics, Global 
Value Chains and Competitiveness) research project and provides an overview of the key 
empirical results from the analysis, as well as policy conclusions focusing on the barriers to 
efficient capital accumulation in the EU. The research analyses the implications of capital 
accumulation, its composition and foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic 
competitiveness with a specific focus on the following issues: 
 interactions between changes in global value chains (GVCs), capital formation and 
foreign direct investment; 
 interactions between productivity growth, changes in investment decisions, capital 
accumulation and capital stock composition; 
 obstacles and barriers to an efficient allocation of capital across Europe. 
 
Figure I provides a stylised combined representation of the relationships between the 
economic phenomena investigated in the project. While the analysis focuses on these 
linkages, other factors impacting each of the variables under consideration have naturally 
been taken into account as control variables. 
 
Figure I. Conceptual framework: relationship between GVC, FDI, capital accumulation and productivity 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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The analysis is carried out at aggregate country and industry levels comparing the dynamics 
within the EU as well as with important peer economies – the US, Japan, China and South 
Korea – depending on the actually available data. To this end we constructed a consistent 
aggregate country- and sector-level database with capital accumulation, global value chain 
participation and FDI variables. The FDI variable has been cleaned from the effects of special 
purpose entities (SPEs) and adjusted to address the change in the statistical classification over 
the observed period (BPM5 to BPM6). In addition, the project took advantage of the newly 
available EU KLEMS data released in October 2019 (developed by wiiw; see Adarov and 
Stehrer, 2019a). This dataset introduced more detailed capital stock composition data, 
including a fine decomposition of capital stock into tangibles and intangibles as well as ICT 
and non-ICT capital, which allowed us to distinguish between the relative importance of 
tangible and intangible ICT capital (the latter is also referred to as the digital capital or the 
capital embedded in software and databases). 
 
Summarising the analytical results, our research makes several contributions to the academic 
literature, as well as to the related policy debates concerning productivity, capital 
accumulation, foreign direct investment, digitalisation, global value chains and economic 
integration. In particular, as regards the analysis of the role of capital flows in the formation 
of global value chains, we show empirically that FDI constitutes an important driver of GVC 
participation and trade in value added. Inward FDI is especially conducive to the formation of 
backward linkages, while outward FDI facilitates forward GVC participation. Examining 
bilateral trade and investment relationships using the gravity model of trade, we find that both 
inward and outward bilateral FDI positively influences trade in value added. Pooled sectoral 
analysis confirms that both inward and outward FDI facilitates GVC integration and that 
inward FDI is especially important for both the backward and the forward integration of 
manufacturing sectors. 
 
A closer look at the estimation results for individual sectors suggests that the positive impact 
of outward FDI on forward GVC participation is driven largely by high-tech manufacturing 
sectors ‒ the machinery, transport and (especially) electrical equipment industries. A 
significant positive impact of inward FDI on backward GVC participation is found in the 
textile and clothing industry as well as in the agricultural and chemicals sectors. While the 
estimated marginal effects of inward FDI on backward linkages in high-tech manufacturing 
 
6 
 
are sizeable, they are not statistically significant. Overall, the textile and clothing sector 
exhibits a particularly strong across-the-board response to FDI and capital formation in terms 
of both upstream and downstream integration. 
 
ICT capital is generally positively associated with backward GVC participation and is 
especially instrumental for backward GVC integration of the electrical and transport 
equipment sectors as well as the chemical industry. At the same time, ICT capital appears to 
negatively impact forward GVC participation of the textile and clothing industry. 
 
Focusing on the drivers of productivity, our analysis shows an important role of ICT capital 
accumulation in facilitating productivity, with an especially robust superior effect found for 
digital capital (as measured by SoftDB under the EU KLEMS capital asset classification used 
in the paper). In fact, digital capital appears to be the only capital asset type among the 14 
capital asset types examined that manifests strongly as a driver of productivity across multiple 
empirical exercises at the sectoral and aggregate levels. Aggregate country-level estimates 
suggest that a 1 percentage point (pp) increase in the growth of real capital stock induces an 
increase in the growth of real labour productivity of about 0.06 pp in the case of tangible ICT 
capital and of 0.09 pp in the case of intangible ICT capital (SoftDB). 
 
On closer sector-level examination we find a relatively stronger impact of ICT on the 
manufacturing sectors, particularly the textile and clothing, coke/refined petroleum and 
machinery manufacturing sectors in the case of intangible ICT capital and for the food 
processing and transport equipment sectors in the case of tangible ICT capital. Besides this, 
the estimates suggest that backward global value chain participation also fosters labour 
productivity as well as EU integration with the progressively increasing cumulative post-
accession effect. However, in contrast to much of the literature, we find no strong evidence of 
the impact of FDI on labour productivity after netting out the impact of SPEs and outliers and 
controlling for labour services, capital composition and convergence effects. 
 
Based on the empirical findings, a number of policy-relevant conclusions can be made as 
regards EU competitiveness and the implications of capital accumulation and composition. In 
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particular, the issues associated with productivity performance in the EU have three important 
dimensions: 
(i) the overall across-the-board slowdown of aggregate productivity growth in the 
post-crisis period (after the Great Recession) for all countries of the EU, including 
its frontier economies, mostly as a result of productivity slowdown across sectors 
(rather than a structural shift towards less productive sectors); 
(ii) the core-periphery structure of the EU economy, with the lagging periphery 
countries struggling to converge towards the frontier EU countries in terms of 
productivity with an insufficient catch-up momentum (observed both before and 
particularly after the crisis); 
(iii) as a result of the combined effect of (i) and (ii), the EU lags on average 
significantly behind the peer economies in terms of productivity, particularly the 
US. The lacklustre performance is observed both in terms of productivity levels 
and productivity growth rates. 
 
In light of the challenges and the revealed importance of the role of ICT capital on 
productivity, it is therefore important to consolidate policy efforts to facilitate investment in 
ICT capital, both tangible ICT and digital capital, as an effective means to enhance the broad-
based competitiveness of the EU economy. In terms of FDI inflows, the EU is currently 
already rather open, with relatively low regulatory restrictions and high volumes of inward 
FDI (although these differ significantly across the individual EU countries). However, as our 
research has demonstrated, the EU is lagging behind its peers, particularly the US, in the 
intensity of ICT investments, including both tangible and intangible ICT capital, as well as the 
effective utilisation of ICT investments. 
 
The factors that hinder ICT investments are multiple and differ across the EU in terms of their 
relative importance. Roughly, the bottlenecks to ICT investment that the EU faces could be 
grouped into several broad categories, discussed in greater detail in this report: 
(i) “Framework conditions” that are related to the overall macroeconomic stance of a 
country and broad socio-economic conditions that inhibit investments in general 
(including FDI); these include the business-cycle dynamics and long-run structural 
bottlenecks hindering investment in general, e.g. the gaps in institutions and 
infrastructure. 
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(ii) ICT investment-specific supply-and-demand factors that impact the ability or 
incentives of the private sector to engage in ICT investment and impact the efficiency 
of ICT; these include access to finance, labour market inefficiencies and other factors 
complementary to ICT use. 
(iii) ICT-specific regulatory bottlenecks, including regulations that inhibit competition, 
lack of regulatory incentives, and financial and technical support to companies 
investing in ICT. 
 
Taking this into consideration, it is important to recognise that the issues regarding ICT 
investment in the EU should also be considered in light of the existing intra-EU socio-
economic asymmetries (the core-periphery structure of the EU that could be traced back to 
productivity differences, diverging economic specialisation patterns, quality of institutions 
and infrastructure etc.), which shape the relative importance of the barriers outlined. In this 
regard the slowdown of ICT investment, similar to the productivity patterns, is attributed to 
two distinct trends: (A) the slowing performance of the frontier EU economies and (B) the 
lack of convergence towards the frontier EU economies by the periphery EU countries, which 
have also historically been lagging behind in terms of competitiveness and productivity. 
 
In light of the revealed importance of the role of ICT capital in accelerating productivity and 
taking into account the impediments discussed in the previous section, the following broad 
policy guidelines appear to be instrumental in facilitating ICT investments: 
- Policies improving the general macroeconomic stability and addressing the structural 
impediments in lagging EU member states as a prerequisite to investment in general. 
- Measures addressing the regulatory bottlenecks that hinder the efficient allocation of 
capital and the absorption of ICT capital, including pro-competition policies, measures 
fostering the further development of the EU single market in line with the four 
freedoms, policies regulating ICT-related areas (data privacy, digitalisation, 
intellectual property, technical standards). 
- ICT-targeted policy incentives, including tax incentives, financial support, public 
procurement, provision of public infrastructure and other forms of financial and 
technical support, especially focusing on the support of small and medium-sized 
enterprises and innovative start-up companies, which experience greater difficulties in 
ICT absorption and scaling up in comparison with large multinational corporations. 
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- Policies fostering deeper financial markets and, in particular, advancing further efforts 
to establish sufficiently deep and efficient capital markets and create a broad-based 
environment that facilitates venture capital and other forms of start-up financing in 
ICT-intensive sectors. 
- Policies facilitating the training of a skilled ICT workforce, including both higher 
education and vocational training, as well as addressing regulatory bottlenecks in 
labour markets as regards the skills mismatch, barriers to cross-country labour 
movements and adequate incentives to facilitate the retention of a skilled workforce in 
the EU. 
 
The extra policy efforts targeted at the efficient adoption of ICT capital, both tangible and 
intangible, fostering technology absorption and broad-based digitalisation, are especially vital 
for the EU in light of its weak post-crisis growth performance, aggravated further by the new 
challenges posed by the deep and lasting negative impacts of the coronavirus disease.1 As 
regards the latter, digitalisation proved to be instrumental in keeping much of the economic 
activities, both public and private, still running under the quarantine regimes, thereby 
alleviating the economic shock.2 The issue is of even greater importance when looking further 
into the future, as the EU, with the exception of its several frontier economies, is falling 
behind not only the global leaders in digital innovation – the US and Japan – but also the 
rapidly developing new competitors from Asia, particularly China and South Korea. Gaining 
momentum in digital transformation via ICT capital investment may further aid the catching-
up process of the lagging EU Member States, especially in light of the general purpose 
technology nature of ICT, thereby improving its internal cohesion and resilience as well as 
more generally strengthening the trust in the transformative power and net benefits the bloc 
may bring to its members, which has lost a lot of steam in the aftermath of the global crisis. 
 
 
  
                                           
1 According to European Commission (2020a), as a result of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) the EU has 
very likely entered the deepest economic recession in its history. The crisis will also lead to a reduction of 
the potential output and a protracted U-shaped recovery uneven across countries. 
2 See, for instance, UNCTAD (2020) for a preliminary review of implication of digitalisation and related policy 
lessons in light of COVID-19. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Competitiveness nowadays is increasingly driven by the ability of countries to foster 
productivity. In turn, productivity is heavily influenced by capital intensity, information and 
communications technology (ICT), intangible capital and digitalisation. We analyse the 
implications of capital accumulation, its composition and foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
economic competitiveness with a specific focus on the following factors: 
 interactions between changes in global value chains (GVCs), capital formation and 
foreign direct investment; 
 interactions between productivity growth, changes in investment decisions, capital 
accumulation and capital stock composition; 
 obstacles and barriers to an efficient allocation of capital across Europe. 
 
The present study constitutes the final report of the CaDoVaC project and provides an 
overview of selected econometric results from the project in a consolidated form, as well as 
an assessment of the barriers to capital allocation (including foreign direct investment). 
 
The detailed discussion of the results focusing on the drivers of GVC participation is 
presented in Adarov and Stehrer (2019b). The results pertaining to the analysis of productivity 
drivers are discussed in Adarov and Stehrer (2020). In the present report the key findings of 
the research are presented in Section 2, followed by an assessment of the possible barriers to 
capital accumulation in Section 3 and the discussion of policy implications in Section 4. 
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2. Overview of key research findings 
2.1. Data and sample 
For the purposes of econometric analysis we assemble a panel dataset that includes aggregate 
country- and sector-level variables of labour productivity, hours worked, labour composition, 
FDI, capital stocks and their composition by asset types, total factor productivity (TFP) 
estimates and other variables employed in the econometric analysis. The sample composition 
is largely determined by the availability of data in the key data sources, particularly the EU 
KLEMS database, which covers EU countries and, among non-EU countries, only the US and 
Japan. We deliberately drop Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland and the Netherlands from 
the sample, as these are the recognised as “tax offshore” countries (see, e.g. Hines, 2010 for a 
list of tax havens), as well as countries for which the data for the key variables of interest are 
missing or too short.3 The resulting panel dataset covers 20 countries over the period 2000-
2017 (Table 2.1.1). 
 
Table 2.1.1 Sample of countries 
Country ISO3 code  Country ISO3 code 
Austria AUT  Greece GRC 
Belgium BEL  Italy ITA 
Czech Republic CZE  Lithuania LTU 
Germany DEU  Latvia LVA 
Denmark DNK  Portugal PRT 
Spain ESP  Slovak Republic SVK 
Estonia EST  Slovenia SVN 
Finland FIN  Sweden SWE 
France FRA  United States US 
United Kingdom GBR  Japan JPN 
 
The FDI data are compiled using Eurostat and OECD data, depending on which source offers 
a longer series for a given country and bridging (to the extent possible) the gaps in the data. 
The OECD and Eurostat use a common framework for reporting FDI statistics, and thus the 
resulting data are internally consistent across the country-sector and time dimensions. In 
general, we follow the conventions and methods used by the Eurostat/OECD framework 
described in the 4th edition of the OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 
BMD4. Importantly, our dataset excludes special purpose entities (SPEs) from the FDI data. 
SPEs are entities that primarily engage in holding activities and facilitate the internal 
financing of multinational enterprises (MNEs) but have little or no physical presence in the 
                                           
3 This mostly occurs when the capital asset data for certain asset type are not available. 
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host economy, which severely distorts the FDI data and adversely affects economic inference 
in formal analysis, particularly for countries hosting financial centres. Together with dropping 
tax-haven countries, this approach allows us to focus only on the FDI dynamics with real 
economic relevance in the context of the productivity analysis. 
 
In addition, given the change in the NACE classification during the period 2000-2017 in order 
to compile a dataset internally consistent across countries and sectors for the entire time 
period, we devised a sectoral classification (based on NACE Rev.2). More specifically, in the 
original Eurostat database the sectoral FDI data for the period 2000-2007 (for some countries 
2009) are available according to BPM5 in NACE Rev.1; for 2008-2012 the data are available 
in BPM5 and according to NACE Rev.2; for 2013-2016 these data are according to BPM6 
and NACE Rev.2. The resulting classification is reported in Table 2.1.2, listing the 
corresponding NACE Rev.2 codes and labelling conventions used in the paper. 
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Table 2.1.2. Classification of sectors 
Note: the table shows the classification of sectors used in the paper with the numerical codes (SEC), corresponding NACE 
Rev. 2 codes, sector full name (based on NACE Rev.2) and short labels used for the brevity of exposition when discussing 
sectoral estimation results. 
SEC NACE Rev.2 codes Sector description (based on NACE 2 classification) Label 
1 A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1_AGRI 
2 B Mining and quarrying 2_MING 
3 10-12 Food products, beverages and tobacco 3_FOOD 
4 13-15 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 4_TXTL 
5 16-18 Wood and paper products; printing and reproduction of recorded media 5_WOOD 
6 19 Coke and refined petroleum products 6_COKE 
7 20-21 Chemicals and chemical products 7_CHEM 
8 22-23 Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products 8_RUBB 
9 24-25 Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 9_METL 
10 26-27 Electrical and optical equipment 10_ELEC 
11 28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 11_MACH 
12 29-30 Transport equipment 12_TRAN 
13 31-33 Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment 13_OMAN 
14 D-E Electricity, gas and water supply 14_GASW 
15 F Construction 15_CONS 
16 45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 16_TRMO 
17 46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 17_WHTR 
18 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 18_RETR 
19 49-52 Transport and storage 19_TRSR 
20 53 Postal and courier activities 20_POST 
21 I Accommodation and food service activities 21_ACCO 
22 J Information and communication 22_INFO 
23 K Financial and insurance activities 23_FINA 
24 L Real estate activities 24_REAL 
25 M-N Professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service activities 25_PROF 
26 O-U Community social and personal services 26_SOCI 
100 TOT Country total 100_TOTL 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The data for capital stocks, their composition by asset types, labour productivity, TFP, hours 
worked and labour composition variables are obtained from the new EU KLEMS 2019 
Release (see Adarov and Stehrer, 2019a for additional details about the database). Besides 
additional time coverage, the new EU KLEMS Release introduces an expanded capital asset 
type classification, in contrast to earlier iterations of the EU KLEMS database. It includes the 
ten asset types available from the national accounts capital data, which had already been 
included in the previous EU KLEMS data: Cultivated assets (Cult); Dwellings (RStruc); 
Other buildings and structures (OCon); Transport equipment (TraEq); Other machinery 
equipment (OMach); Computer hardware (IT); Telecommunications equipment (CT); 
Computer software and databases (SoftDB); Research and development (RD); and Other 
intellectual property products (OIPP). In addition, the database introduces four new 
“supplementary” intangible asset types, including Advertising and Market Research 
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Tangible assets Intangible assets 
(AdvMRes), Design (Design), Purchased Organisational Capital (POCap) and Vocational 
Training (VT). 
 
Figure 2.1.1. Capital asset aggregates 
  
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate asset types outside the boundaries of National Accounts. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Haskel and Westlake (2018). 
 
Therefore we distinguish 14 capital asset types. For the purposes of econometric analysis, in 
order to make the list of asset types more manageable and focused on the role of 
tangibles/intangibles and ICT/non-ICT capital, as well as to gain greater efficiency in the 
estimations given a relatively small sample size, in the baseline analysis we follow Haskel and 
Westlake (2018) and group the 14 asset types into six broader aggregates, as outlined in 
Figure 2.1.1 
 
The data for GDP, institutional development and educational attainment are obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Penn World Tables (PWT) 9.1 data. 
Based on the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), we compute measures of backward and 
forward global value chain participation (GVC participation) in line with Koopman et al. 
(2014). Additional technical details on the derivation of backward, forward and total GVC 
participation measures at the aggregate country and sectoral levels are discussed in Adarov 
and Stehrer (2019b) and Adarov and Stehrer (2020). 
ICT
IT
CT
NonICT
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OCon
OMach
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2.2 Productivity dynamics in Europe: a comparative perspective 
This section reviews the productivity dynamics in Europe over time and relative to peer 
economies. As a measure of labour productivity we use real output per hour worked (at the 
annual frequency), which better reflects the productivity concept in comparison with the 
alternative measure of labour productivity per person employed, as it is not prone to the bias 
associated with full-time versus part-time workers. In addition, we also review total factor 
productivity (TFP) dynamics based on the EU KLEMS and PWT 9.1 data. TFP conveys the 
combined productivity of labour and capital inputs and is estimated as a residual term of the 
production function. 
 
As reported in the literature, sluggish productivity growth has been a major challenge for 
many economies worldwide, particularly in the post-crisis period. As can be seen in 
Figure 2.2.1, most of the European countries suffered a major slowdown in labour 
productivity and TFP growth in the aftermath of the Great Recession, followed by a double-
dip recession. The lacklustre productivity dynamics did not improve in the post-2013 period 
either ‒ on the contrary, for most countries the slowdown persisted, and productivity is still 
hardly seen to be on the path to recovery. With the exception of Ireland, Spain, Italy and 
Denmark, labour productivity has decelerated further in the post-crisis period. Especially 
strong productivity losses were incurred by the Baltic countries and Romania, where the 
average productivity growth declined by more than 3 percentage points after the crisis. 
  
 
16 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1. Productivity dynamics 
Note: The figure shows real labour productivity (per hour worked) growth and real labour productivity level (in 2010 USD 
million), as well as TFP growth and TFP level (relative to the US). The figures indicate 2000-2017 averages along with the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis period averages (with and without the double-dip recession period). Countries are sorted by ISO3 in 
alphabetic order. EU28 indicates EU28 average values. 
Labour productivity growth, year-on-year % change Labour productivity level (2010 USD million) 
  
TFP growth, year-on-year, % change TFP level (US = 1) 
  
Source: Own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 and PWT 9.1 data. 
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Figure 2.2.2. Pre-crisis and post-crisis labour productivity growth differential 
Note: The figure shows the percentage-point difference between the average 2010-2017 and the average 2000-2006 growth 
rates of real labour productivity. The countries are sorted by the labour productivity growth differential. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU KLEMS 2019. 
While the recent years were characterised by particularly lasting and sizeable productivity 
losses, it should be noted that the productivity slowdown was not a phenomenon observed in 
the post-crisis years only; rather, many European countries, both advanced and developing, 
suffered from productivity decelerations in the pre-crisis period as well. For instance, in 
Germany both labour productivity and TFP growth suffered a drop in the years 2002-2003 
amid a generally long-run downward trend (Figure 2.2.3). 
 
Besides the common cyclical and structural issues underlying the productivity slowdown, the 
productivity dynamics are driven by economic convergence processes accelerated by 
economic integration, as countries with lower absolute productivity levels generally tend to 
enjoy a faster productivity growth rate than high-productivity economies (Figure 2.2.4). This 
has been a particularly important factor for Europe, as multi-speed EU integration facilitates 
institutional and infrastructural upgrading of the countries lagging behind ‒ the transition 
economies and the Western Balkan countries. At the same time, a group of countries 
comprising Portugal, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, and to a lesser extent Italy and Spain, 
nevertheless lag behind their comparable European peers and exhibit lower productivity 
dynamics than expected, based on the general statistical association between productivity 
levels and productivity growth rates as inferred from the scatterplots in Figure 2.2.4. 
 
As a related matter, given the strong heterogeneity of European countries in terms of 
productivity levels and growth, the average productivity (for instance, the EU28 average 
plotted also for reference in Figure 2.2.1 for the pre-crisis, post-crisis and the full sample 
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period) may be misleading as a characteristic of a general stance of the EU, particularly in 
comparison with peer non-European economies such as the US or Japan. However, in general 
most European countries tend to lag behind the US in terms of both labour productivity and 
TFP levels (particularly in the post-crisis period), and in many cases also in terms of 
productivity growth rates. There are only a few EU countries that are at or close to the global 
“productivity frontier” ‒ the advanced countries like Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and 
Denmark. These countries, as noted, are naturally also characterised by lower productivity 
growth rates. The notable exception is Ireland, which has demonstrated an especially high 
level of productivity (both labour productivity and TFP) coupled with high productivity 
growth rates, which also proved to be resilient to the post-crisis growth malaise (the average 
post-crisis growth rate has increased relative to the pre-crisis period by 4.3 pp and 2.7 pp for 
labour productivity and TFP, respectively). In fact, Ireland has recently been the most 
productive country in the world. Its especially high productivity levels are attributed to the 
heavy presence of multinational corporations in the economy.4 
 
With the exception of selected high-performance economies it is clear, however, that many 
EU countries tend to fall behind the US in terms of aggregate labour and TFP productivity, 
and in many cases also below the productivity levels of Japan. As a result of the combined 
effect of a broad-based slowdown in productivity across Europe as well as the lasting 
structural productivity issues faced by certain EU countries (in particular, protracted 
productivity convergence of the lagging economies of Central, East and Southeast Europe and 
macroeconomic issues associated with Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain), the EU has fallen 
behind both the US and Japan. The US labour productivity level is almost twice as high as the 
EU average ‒ a trend that persisted both before and after the recent crisis (see Figure 2.2.1). 
The EU suffered a major setback in its productivity growth rate as a result of the crisis, and 
although it still enjoys a productivity growth rate moderately above that of the US in the post-
crisis period, bridging this gap appears to be an uphill struggle in light of the ongoing 
challenges faced by the EU. 
  
                                           
4 Notably, while the multinational companies in Ireland are highly productive, the productivity of domestic enterprises is 
much lower (also below the OECD average). High productivity is associated with the relatively small number of frontier 
multinational companies operating in several foreign-dominated sectors, particularly the pharmaceutical, ICT and food 
sectors, as argued in the analytical report by the Irish National Competitiveness Council (2019). 
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Figure 2.2.3. Labour productivity trends, selected countries, 2000-2017 
Note: The figure shows labour productivity growth over the period 2010-2017 of selected economies along with the pre- and 
post-crisis linear trend for Germany and sample pre- and post-crisis (simple) average growth rates 
 
Figure 2.2.4. Long-run productivity convergence 
Labour 
productivity 
 
TFP 
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A comparative overview of sectoral labour productivity dynamics reported in Figure 2.2.5 for 
each of the 26 sectors as outlined in Section 2 reveals similar meagre patterns, with most EU 
countries lagging behind the US with the exception of selected frontier economies ‒ Austria, 
Germany, Finland, Belgium, Denmark and other advanced industrialised economies (although 
the relative standing of countries differs across sectors). Inter alia, the productivity hold-up is 
visible in the high-tech manufacturing cluster (sectors 10_ELEC, 11_MACH, 12_TRAN): 
both Japan and the US surpass the average EU productivity in these sectors significantly, with 
the gap widening in the post-crisis period as the EU suffered major losses in the productivity 
growth dynamics in these sectors, especially in 10_ELEC and 11_MACH, which were the 
leaders in terms of productivity growth dynamics in the EU before the crisis (see Figure 3.6 
for a comparative review of the average EU productivity by sectors before and after the 
crisis). In light of the observed concurrent weakening of productivity across multiple sectors, 
it is important to note that the decline in the aggregate national productivity therefore appears 
to be associated to a greater extent with common nationwide structural and cyclical 
challenges, rather than with the shift of the economic structure of European countries towards 
sectors with lower productivity growth rates (although the latter might still contribute to 
aggregate productivity slowdown). 
 
In light of these developments in productivity as one of the key aspects of the project, we 
analyse the implications of capital accumulation and structure as well as FDI on productivity 
as the major factors of competitiveness. In addition, we explore the impact of capital and FDI 
on global value chains, which in turn also impacts productivity patterns. Selected results are 
discussed in the next subsections. 
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Figure 2.2.5. Productivity dynamics by sectors (levels) 
Note: The figure shows real labour productivity levels in 2010 USD million for the 26 sectors as outlined in Table 2.2. The 
figures indicate 2000-2017 averages along with the pre-crisis and post-crisis period averages (with and without the double-
dip recession period). Countries are sorted by ISO3 in alphabetic order. EU28 indicates average EU28 values. 
1_AGRI 2_MING 
  
3_FOOD 4_TXTL 
  
5_WOOD 6_COKE 
  
Source: Own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure 2.2.5 (cont.) 
 
7_CHEM 8_RUBB 
  
9_METL 10_ELEC 
  
11_MACH 12_TRAN 
  
Source: Own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure 2.2.5 (cont.) 
 
13_OMAN 14_GASW 
  
15_CONS 16_TRMO 
  
17_WHTR 18_RETR 
  
Source: Own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure 2.2.5 (cont.) 
 
19_TRSR 20_POST 
  
21_ACCO 22_INFO 
  
23_FINA 24_REAL 
  
Source: Own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure 2.2.5 (cont.) 
 
25_PROF 26_SOCI 
  
Source: Own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.6. Labour productivity by sectors: EU28 average before and after the crisis 
Note: The figure shows real labour productivity growth rates before and after the crisis along with the 45-degree line. Sector 
6_COKE is omitted for clarity. 
 
Source: Own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data.  
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2.3 Drivers of productivity and the role of capital dynamics and 
composition: evidence from the econometric analysis 
In this section we use panel data techniques to examine the impact of capital accumulation 
and structure on productivity at aggregate country and sectoral levels, controlling for the 
impact of other relevant factors, including global value chain participation and economic 
integration.5 To this end the following specification is estimated: 
 
ΔlnPRODct =  α1lnPRODct−1 + α2lnLct + ∑ β𝑞
q∈Q
ΔlnKqct  + σΔlnFDIct−1 + 𝛏𝐗𝐜𝐭  + 𝛍𝐜 + εct 
where ΔlnPRODct is the measure of productivity in country c (real value added per hour 
worked), in log-differenced form (thus conveying its growth rate). The term lnPRODct−1 is the 
lagged level of real labour productivity capturing the convergence effect. ΔlnLct is the labour 
input: the growth of the labour services, which is used for baseline estimations, or a 
combination of the hours worked and the change in the labour composition, i.e. ∆ ln Lct =
∆ ln LCct + ∆ ln Hct. 
 
The term ΔlnKqct denotes the measure of capital inputs. The baseline model uses real capital 
stocks in log-differences distinguishing between several capital asset types (alternative 
specifications include capital services growth and the change in real capital stocks as a share 
of employed persons). In the baseline analysis we distinguish the six broader capital asset 
groups as defined in Section 2.1, i.e. the set Q = {SoftDB; NonICT; ICT; RD; OInnProp; 
EconComp}. In additional empirical exercises the 14 detailed capital asset types are included 
instead of the aggregate groups. 
 
The variable ΔlnFDIct−1 denotes a measure of foreign direct investment; the baseline model 
employs inward FDI growth (real inward FDI stock in log-differences),6 alternative 
specifications use the change in the inward FDI stock as a share of GDP and the ratio of (real) 
inward FDI stock to the persons employed in log-differences. In order to address possible 
endogeneity issues, the FDI variable is lagged by one or more years.7 In additional empirical 
exercises the model is further augmented by other explanatory variables of interest 
                                           
5 The chapter is based on the analysis reported in Adarov and Stehrer (2020). 
6 GDP deflators are used to compute FDI in constant prices. 
7 In additional robustness exercises we also explore deeper lags of capital and FDI variables. 
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comprising constituting the vector 𝐗𝐜𝐭, including interaction terms of FDI with various 
variables conveying “absorptive capacity” ‒ institutional variables (World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators measuring government effectiveness and control of corruption), 
educational attainment, quality of infrastructure, financial development measured as private 
credit-to-GDP ratio and others. Other exercises also incorporate GVC participation measures 
and EU integration variables to measure the effects of deeper economic integration, which 
could be important for productivity gains. Finally, 𝝁𝒄 denotes the vector of country and year 
fixed effects, capturing unobserved country heterogeneity and common year-specific shocks. 
 
The model is estimated via fixed effects with standard errors clustered by country (“FE”) as 
the baseline estimator ‒ the results are reported in Table 2.3.1 with the benchmark 
specification listed in column 1 (other specifications are reported for robustness). We drop 
outliers beyond 2 standard deviations from the mean for the key variables of interest (labour 
productivity growth, real capital stock growth by asset types and real FDI stock growth), 
which nevertheless retains 90% of the original data. 
 
The analysis strongly suggests that investment in ICT capital is associated with the increase in 
labour productivity, consistent with the idea that advanced technology embodied in ICT 
effectively complements workers’ skills leading to productive efficiency gains. More 
generally, ICT capital, being a general-purpose technology, has multiple channels via which it 
may influence broad-based productivity at the country level, including faster and more 
efficient communication, better data management practices and enhanced data flow, thereby 
also reducing information inefficiencies and fostering knowledge creation and transfer. 
Notably, both tangible ICT (ICT) and intangible ICT (SoftDB) variables are statistically 
significant and imply sizeable economic effects: a 1 pp increase in the growth of real capital 
stock induces an increase in real labour productivity growth of about 0.06 pp in the case of the 
tangible ICT capital, and of 0.09 pp in the case of the intangible SoftDB capital. In fact, the 
impact of SoftDB is more profound relative to the ICT aggregate in terms of the magnitude 
and manifests itself more strongly across multiple specification and robustness checks, 
including alternative samples and models. 
 
Contrary to expectations, no impact of FDI on productivity is found. In fact, the effect does 
not manifest at deeper lags of the FDI variable and after adjusting for the country’s absorption 
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capacity as proxied by institutional development, human capital and financial development 
measures. This implies that, after imposing a strict control over the sample, that is, removing 
the impact of strong outliers like Ireland and removing the bias associated with SPEs and 
controlling for other factors, the role of FDI as a booster of labour productivity may not be 
significant, at least not in the relatively short time spans of several years. This is, however, 
consistent with the idea that FDI is targeted at countries (or sectors) with already high levels 
of productivity (which is captured in the specification by the lagged labour productivity 
variable), but does not robustly contribute much per se to further productivity growth. 
 
Table 2.3.1. Aggregate country-level estimation results 
Note: The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects (‘FE’) with standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses), as well as 
pooled OLS (‘POLS’) and system GMM (‘GMM’) based on 3-year non-overlapping averages. The dependent variable is ΔLn (Labour 
productivity). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  FE FE FE FE FE POLS GMM 
        Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.122*** -0.119*** 
 
-0.135*** -0.106*** -0.010*** -0.117** 
 
(0.021) (0.019) 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.002) (0.047) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.333*** 
 
-0.397*** -0.327*** -0.356*** -0.325*** -0.282* 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.079) (0.079) (0.068) (0.059) (0.166) 
Labour composition growth 
 
-0.028 
     
  
(0.151) 
     ΔLn (Hours worked) 
 
-0.378*** 
     
  
(0.072) 
     ΔLn (Inward FDI stock), lag -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 
 
-0.004 -0.011 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.007) (0.035) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) -0.039* -0.031 -0.040 
 
-0.029 -0.012 -0.099 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.073) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) 0.055** 0.061*** 0.045** 
 
0.040** 0.031** 0.030 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.059) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) -0.037 0.018 -0.063 
 
-0.006 -0.002 0.119 
 
(0.122) (0.103) (0.120) 
 
(0.114) (0.096) (0.323) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.002 -0.003 -0.021 
 
0.013 0.008 0.026 
 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.054) 
 
(0.049) (0.054) (0.098) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.046 0.041 0.057 
 
0.041 0.020 0.014 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044) 
 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.084) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) 0.085** 0.085*** 0.091** 
 
0.083*** 0.091** 0.105* 
 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.035) 
 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.060) 
ΔLn (Labour productivity), lag 
      
-0.043 
       
(0.185) 
Constant -0.370*** -0.362*** 0.016*** -0.425*** -0.326*** -0.018* -0.347** 
 (0.066) (0.061) (0.004) (0.074) (0.068) (0.009) (0.145) 
        
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        Observations 216 216 216 248 262 216 76 
Adj. R-squared 0.581 0.593 0.521 0.495 0.589 0.468  
 
As expected, lagged labour productivity level is negative and significant throughout 
specifications, indicating strong convergence effects as countries with lower productivity 
levels generally enjoy a faster catch-up productivity growth. Introducing deeper lags of the 
real labour productivity variable as a robustness check yields very similar results. The growth 
of labour services is overwhelmingly associated with the decline in labour productivity. 
Decomposition of the labour services variable into its components – the hours worked and the 
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labour composition (Column 2) reveals that this effect is entirely attributed to the negative 
impact of the growth in the hours worked, which confirms the conjecture of diminishing 
marginal returns to labour inputs. 
 
We then test the impact of additional factors that may influence productivity dynamics, 
including the effects of GVC participation and European economic integration, and explore in 
more detail the implications of FDI for labour productivity, as the baseline estimation results 
did not reveal any significant impact despite expectations. The results are reported in Table 
2.3.2. 
 
Table 2.3.2. The impact of GVC participation and EU membership 
Note: The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects with standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses). The dependent 
variable is ΔLn (Labour productivity). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. “FDI” in the interaction 
terms refers to real inward FDI stock in log-differences, i.e. ΔLn (Inward FDI stock). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.148*** -0.148*** 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.339*** -0.339*** -0.336*** -0.347*** -0.334*** -0.342*** -0.342*** 
 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.080) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.044 -0.039* -0.027 -0.027 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) 0.043** 0.043** 0.043** 0.039* 0.055** 0.060** 0.060** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) 0.036 0.036 0.015 0.048 -0.034 -0.050 -0.050 
 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.128) (0.123) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.056 0.056 0.054 0.053 0.046 0.036 0.036 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) 0.075** 0.075** 0.082** 0.070** 0.085** 0.081** 0.081** 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) 
FDI = ΔLn (Inward FDI stock), lag -0.014* -0.014* -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Δ Backward GVC, lag 0.200** 0.204** 
 
0.237** 
   
 
(0.085) (0.076) 
 
(0.091) 
   Δ Forward GVC, lag -0.017 
 
-0.139 -0.108 
   
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.146) (0.179) 
   FDI × Δ Backward GVC , lag 
   
-0.083 
   
    
(0.461) 
   FDI × Δ Forward GVC, lag 
   
1.664 
   
    
(1.001) 
   FDI × Transition economy DV, lag 
    
0.003 
  
     
(0.016) 
  EU membership DV 
     
0.015** 0.015** 
      
(0.006) (0.006) 
Years in the EU 
      
0.006* 
       
(0.003) 
Constant -0.366*** -0.365*** -0.395*** -0.368*** -0.367*** -0.468*** -0.664*** 
 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.083) (0.067) (0.096) (0.163) 
       
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 193 193 193 193 216 216 216 
Adj. R-squared 0.601 0.603 0.594 0.604 0.579 0.585 0.585 
 
Across all specifications the marginal effect of ICT and SoftDB remains significant. We first 
examine the impact of backward and forward GVC participation on productivity. While 
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forward GVC integration does not reveal any impact, backward GVC participation enters 
significantly with the marginal impact of 0.2, which implies that an increase in backward 
GVC participation by 0.1 induces a 2 pp increase in aggregate labour productivity growth.8 It 
is intuitive that participation in global value chains provides an opportunity for productivity 
gains owing to knowledge spillovers from MNEs and efficiency gains associated with greater 
specialisation in certain tasks. In this respect the results highlight the important difference in 
the relative gains associated with the mode of GVC participation, i.e. specialisation in 
relatively more downstream industries as picked up by the backward GVC participation 
measure, as firms are able to take advantage of imported inputs of superior quality and at 
lower costs and, in general, the greater available variety of foreign inputs. 
 
GVC integration is closely related to FDI, as both are coordinated by MNEs. Therefore, we 
also assess the possible interaction between FDI and GVC participation. The impact of FDI is 
nevertheless not found to be significant, consistent with the baseline model results. Although 
the literature suggests that the impact of FDI may be conditional on the absorptive capacity of 
the host country, we also do not find support for this conjecture, as the inclusion of interaction 
terms (educational attainment variables, human capital, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, financial development variables) does not yield statistically significant results. 
 
Finally, we augment the model with the EU dummy variable that takes the value of unity if 
the country is an EU member in year t and is zero otherwise. Additionally, the variable 
measuring the total number of years in the EU of a given country is introduced to gauge the 
possible non-linear effects associated with the intensity of integration.9 Notably, both 
variables enter statistically significantly, implying that EU membership boosts labour 
productivity growth by 1.5 pp, with each year in the bloc bringing an additional increase of 
0.6 pp, ceteris paribus, i.e. in addition to the general convergence effects. 
 
We then run similar estimations for each of the 26 sectors as outlined above. We find a 
relatively stronger impact in the case of the manufacturing sectors, particularly for the textile 
                                           
8 For reference, backward GVC participation measure by construction is contained in the (0; 1) interval. In this respect a change in the 
backward GVC participation of the magnitude of 0.1 is a significant increase: de facto backward GVC participation for the sample 
under consideration varies from 0.09 (US) to 0.52 (Hungary); the sample year-on-year change in the backward GVC participation 
varies from -0.05 to +0.04 with the mean of 0.005. 
9 To this end we use the year of entry for each country, starting from the Treaties of Rome (i.e. the year 1958) as listed by the European 
Commission on the EU portal: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#tab-0-1. 
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and clothing, coke/refined petroleum and machinery manufacturing sectors in the case of 
intangible ICT and for the food processing and transport equipment sectors in the case of 
tangible ICT capital (see Figure 2.3.1). However, consistent with aggregate country-level 
results, FDI does not reveal a statistically significant impact. 
 
The positive impact of tangible ICT capital accumulation (ICT capital asset group) is found 
for sectors 3_FOOD and 12_TRAN. Among the services sectors, the significant effect 
(although only at the 10% level) is found for the sector 22_INFO, which is in line with 
expectations, as the provision of information and communications services relies heavily on 
tangible and intangible ICT capital. In all three cases the magnitude of the effect is about 0.1. 
At the same time, notably, the impact of intangible ICT capital (SoftDB capital asset group) is 
much more profound, with especially strong positive effects in terms of both statistical and 
economic significance observed in sectors 4_TXTL, 16_TRMO and 6_COKE. In the latter 
case the magnitude is particularly high, implying almost a 1-to-1 increase in labour 
productivity growth associated with the growth in the SoftDB capital. SoftDB capital also 
enters positively for the sector 11_MACH, but the effect is less significant statistically and in 
terms of economic significance (the estimate varies in the range of 0.08-0.1 across 
specifications). Surprisingly, intangible ICT also has a negative impact on sector 5_WOOD. 
Overall, the results observed across all specifications do not reveal strong systematic patterns 
across sectoral groups; while the high-tech sectors and sectors involved in the provision of 
information and communications services tend to exhibit more consistent positive response of 
productivity growth to ICT and RD capital, the impact of capital composition varies 
significantly and is specific to each sector. 
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Figure 2.3.1. Marginal impact of FDI, ICT and non-ICT capital on labour productivity by sector 
Note: The figure shows the average estimated marginal impact of ICT capital, along with the 90% and 99% confidence 
intervals (indicated light and dark blue bars, respectively). 
SoftDB ICT 
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2.4 Implications of foreign direct investment, capital formation 
and its structure for global value chains 
While we do not find a statistically significant impact of FDI on productivity directly, we 
identify a robust impact of FDI on GVC participation, which thereby also impacts 
productivity. In particular, we find that inward FDI is especially conducive to the formation of 
backward linkages, while outward FDI facilitates forward GVC participation, especially in 
high-tech manufacturing sectors. A particularly robust influence of FDI and capital 
accumulation on GVC integration is identified in the textile and clothing industry. While 
capital accumulation in general intensifies GVC linkages for most sectors, ICT capital appears 
to be especially instrumental for backward integration of the electrical and transport 
equipment sectors. This subsection discusses the key results from this analysis (for the full 
analysis see Adarov and Stehrer, 2019b). 
 
Figure 2.4.1 shows the general positive association between inward FDI and total GVC 
participation, as well as illustrates the extent to which the results could be biased with SPEs 
and outlier tax-haven countries included in the sample. 
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Figure 2.4.1. Relationship between GVC participation and inward FDI adjusting for SPEs 
Note: The left panels show the data for the year 2014. The right panels show the relationship for the panel data with the fitted 
linear regression line. The top panels report the data with FDI inward stocks excluding SPEs, the middle panels report the 
data with FDI inward stocks including SPEs (for clarity, outliers LUX and NLD are excluded in the top panels). 
Excluding SPEs (excluding LUX and NLD)  
  
 
Including SPEs (excluding LUX and NLD) 
 
  
 
Excluding SPEs (with LUX and NLD) 
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Following empirical literature and given the focus of our study on the role of FDI and capital 
as possible drivers of GVC participation, we estimate the following specification: 
 
𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐾𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝜳𝑿𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
 
where 𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑡 denotes a GVC participation measure (forward, backward and total GVC 
participation variables used consecutively in alternative specifications); FDIct−1 is the FDI 
measure (alternative specifications employ inward FDI stock or outward FDI stock as a share 
of GDP); 𝐾𝑐𝑡−1 denotes real capital stock as a share of GDP. The FDI and capital variables 
thus convey the relative capital intensity of a country. In additional empirical exercises we 
also distinguish ICT and non-ICT capital, as well as disaggregate capital by asset types as 
discussed in the section above. 
 
The vector of control variables 𝑿𝑐𝑡−1 includes a range of variables deemed to be important in 
the literature on GVC integration: real GDP as a measure of country size; real effective 
exchange rate (REER) in log differences; real GDP per capita as a general measure of a 
country’s level of economic development; real labour productivity measured as value added 
per hour worked by persons engaged; share of manufacturing value added in GDP as a proxy 
for the overall level of industrialisation of a country; real GDP growth rate; average applied 
import tariff rate and institutional quality indicators (World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of control of corruption, regulatory quality, government effectiveness). Some of the 
variables are, however, collinear (for instance, labour productivity, per-capita income and 
institutional quality) and are thus not included simultaneously in regressions. 
 
We also introduce year fixed effects to control for common time-varying factors, e.g. the 
global or Europe-wide business cycle dynamics. In addition, we control for cross-country 
heterogeneity by introducing fixed effects or using time averages of continuous variables 
(discussed below). 
 
As the dependent variables are bounded in the (0; 1) interval, one cannot use conventional 
linear panel data models. Therefore, as a baseline case we use fractional response models in 
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line with Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Papke and Wooldridge (2008), which develop an 
estimation framework based on generalised, linear-model quasi-likelihood estimators with the 
logit or probit link function. More specifically, as the baseline model we utilise fractional 
probit with standard errors clustered by country. For robustness, we also estimate fractional 
logit, panel fixed effects, random effects models and pooled OLS with the logistic 
transformation applied to the dependent variable as follows: GVCLTR = ln [
𝐺𝑉𝐶
1−𝐺𝑉𝐶
] . 
 
At the same time, introducing cross-section dummy variables to control for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity in the given model may lead to inconsistent estimates in small 
samples, particularly when T (time periods) is fixed and N (cross-section units) is large ‒ the 
incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948). Therefore, in addition to fixed 
effects we also use the device developed by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) to 
impose some structure on the correlation between the unobserved effects and model variables, 
in line with the Papke and Wooldridge (2008) suggestions, also known as correlated random 
effects (CRE). In essence, the Mundlak-Chamberlain transformation controls for unobserved 
country heterogeneity by augmenting the regression with time averages of all continuous 
covariates for each country instead of fixed effects, while the variables are included as 
deviations from respective means. 
 
Finally, in order to deal with potential endogeneity issues we lag explanatory variables by one 
period. In this regard, of particular concern for the hypothesis of interest is the potential (and 
likely) causal feedback from GVC participation to FDI variable. Therefore, for robustness, we 
also perform a range of additional estimations allowing for endogenous regressors via a two-
stage estimation procedure in line with Wooldridge (2014), which involves regressing the FDI 
variable on model covariates in the first stage and augmenting the fractional probit model in 
the second step by first-stage residuals. 
 
Estimations involving the baseline model (fractional probit) are reported in Table 2.4.1 for 
backward, forward and total GVC participation. Controlling for time-invariant country effects 
and thereby making use only of within-unit variation generally renders estimates for the key 
variables of interest (FDI and capital stock intensity) insignificant. As discussed in the 
methodology section, the use of country fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
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leads to inconsistent estimates in small samples. Yet the results from the Mundlak-
Chamberlain CRE model (Table 2.4.3) also suggest insignificance of within-country variance 
in explaining the impact of FDI and capital dynamics on GVC participation (in this case only 
GDP and REER remain statistically significant). At the same time, examining time averages 
using estimation also allows to infer to some extent the role of within-country to between-
country variation in explaining GVC participation. In fact, much of the variation in the key 
variables of interest (GVC participation, relative capital stock and FDI stock intensity) does 
not change significantly over time, and within-panel variation after removing time trend and 
common business cycle effects, particularly the impact of the late 2000s Great Recession, is 
much smaller than between-panel variation. Therefore, we focus primarily on estimation 
results of models that also make use of cross-country variation, for instance, reported in Table 
2.4.1 (although it should be noted that these results may be driven by unobserved cross-
country heterogeneity). 
 
In Table 2.4.1 the results are listed for backward, forward and total GVC participation with 
inward and outward FDI included, along with the capital stock intensity variable. Overall, we 
find that inward FDI stock ratio is positively associated with backward GVC participation, 
while outward FDI is conducive to forward GVC participation. Both inward and outward FDI 
stock ratio estimates are positive and statistically significant at least at the 10% level in total 
GVC participation. Estimates suggest that the capital stock to GDP ratio positively affected 
backward and total GVC participation with high statistical significance. 
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Table 2.4.1. Drivers of GVC participation, country-level analysis, estimates 
Note: The table shows the results of fractional regression estimations with probit link function. Standard errors clustered by 
countries are in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Backward 
GVC participation 
Forward 
GVC participation 
Total 
GVC participation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Inward FDI stock, share of GDP 0.465* 
 
0.062 
 
0.502*** 
 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.156) 
 Outward FDI stock, share of GDP 
 
-0.017 
 
0.255* 
 
0.253* 
  
(0.205) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.144) 
Real capital stock, share of GDP 0.135*** 0.143*** -0.081*** -0.068*** 0.066*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017) 
REER, log diff 0.026 0.057 -0.154 -0.092 -0.140 -0.048 
 
(0.104) (0.158) (0.113) (0.122) (0.101) (0.120) 
Labour productivity, log 0.175** 0.206* -0.137** -0.194*** 0.045 0.015 
 
(0.082) (0.113) (0.055) (0.066) (0.048) (0.074) 
Real GDP, log -0.058** -0.074*** 0.001 0.008 -0.045*** -0.052*** 
 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) 
Manuf. value added, % of GDP 0.010 0.012 0.004 0.005 0.010** 0.012* 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Constant -0.291 0.070 0.004 -0.091 0.687** 0.946** 
 
(0.496) (0.584) (0.366) (0.356) (0.339) (0.376) 
       Obs. 178 178 178 178 178 178 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.023 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.016 
 
 
Table 2.4.2. Drivers of GVC participation, country-level analysis, predictive margins 
Note: The table shows average marginal effects associated with the estimates reported in Table 2.4.1. Delta-method standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Backward 
GVC participation 
Forward 
GVC participation 
Total 
GVC participation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Inward FDI stock, share of GDP 0.157* 
 
0.019 
 
0.196*** 
 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.060) 
 Outward FDI stock, share of GDP 
 
-0.006 
 
0.079* 
 
0.099* 
  
(0.069) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.056) 
Real capital stock, share of GDP 0.046*** 0.049*** -0.025*** -0.021*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
REER, log diff 0.009 0.019 -0.047 -0.028 -0.055 -0.019 
 
(0.035) (0.054) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.047) 
Labour productivity, log 0.059** 0.070* -0.042** -0.060*** 0.017 0.006 
 
(0.028) (0.038) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.029) 
Real GDP, log -0.020** -0.025*** 0.000 0.003 -0.017*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Manuf. value added, % of GDP 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.005** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Table 2.4.3. Alternative estimators, backward GVC participation. 
Note: The table shows results from the fractional probit (baseline), fractional logit, Mundlak-Chamberlain correlated random effects, two-
stage endogenous regressor models with and without country fixed effects, panel fixed effects, random effects and pooled OLS (the latter 
three models employ a logistically transformed GVC variable). In model 3: TA indicates panel time averages, variables enter the model as 
deviations from the respective panel means. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one period. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Frac 
probit 
Frac logit 
Mundlak 
CRE 
2-st. 
endog 
2-st. 
endog 
FE RE POLS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Inward FDI stock, share of GDP 0.465* 0.754* 0.016 -0.071 0.582* 0.080 0.023 0.748 
 
(0.252) (0.428) (0.158) (0.184) (0.350) (0.284) (0.230) (0.429) 
Real capital stock, share of GDP 0.135*** 0.220*** -0.059 -0.048 0.143*** -0.076 0.154** 0.227*** 
 
(0.024) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.022) (0.088) (0.073) (0.044) 
REER, log diff 0.026 0.062 -0.236*** -0.165*** -0.022 -0.370*** -0.534*** 0.032 
 
(0.104) (0.175) (0.072) (0.061) (0.083) (0.112) (0.135) (0.190) 
Real GDP, log -0.058** -0.098*** -0.807*** -0.773*** -0.074*** -1.267*** -0.169*** -0.099** 
 
(0.023) (0.038) (0.171) (0.185) (0.023) (0.298) (0.049) (0.040) 
Labour productivity, log 0.175** 0.288** 0.600*** 0.506*** 0.196** 0.849*** 0.267*** 0.299* 
 
(0.082) (0.138) (0.156) (0.168) (0.080) (0.220) (0.092) (0.145) 
Manuf. value added, % of GDP 0.010 0.017 -0.011*** -0.008** 0.012* -0.014* 0.004 0.016 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) 
TA (Inward FDI stock, share of GDP) 
  
0.657*** 
     
   
(0.139) 
     TA (Real capital stock, share of GDP) 
  
0.056*** 
     
   
(0.019) 
     TA (REER, log diff) 
  
11.784**
*      
   
(1.528) 
     TA (Real GDP, log) 
  
-0.065*** 
     
   
(0.008) 
     TA (Labour productivity, log) 
  
0.227*** 
     
   
(0.024) 
     TA (Manuf. value added, % of GDP) 
  
0.006*** 
     
   
(0.002) 
     Constant -0.291 -0.396 -0.053 18.511**
* 
0.098 30.762**
* 
2.166 -0.453 
 
(0.496) (0.830) (0.205) (4.568) (0.507) (7.581) (1.361) (0.861) 
Obs. 178 178 178 166 166 178 178 178 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No Yes No Yes No No 
 
However, in the case of forward GVC participation the estimated impact is negative, although 
the magnitude of the effect is much smaller in comparison with the influence of capital stock 
on backward linkages. Additional estimations suggest that the result is driven largely by 
Poland and the UK, which are both characterised by a high degree of forward GVC 
integration and low capital-to-GDP ratios compared with the rest of the European sample, 
based on EU KLEMS real capital stock data.10 In general, the results for forward GVC 
participation are less robust than those for backward GVC participation as regards sensitivity 
to the country sample composition, share of variance explained, significance and stability of 
estimates. 
 
The use of probit-based models poses issues with the interpretation of the coefficients in 
terms of the magnitudes of the effects. Therefore, Table 2.4.2 provides the mean marginal 
effects computed for the respective estimates listed in Table 2.4.1. The results suggest that an 
                                           
10 Re-estimating the model without Poland and the UK renders the impact of the capital-to-GDP ratio statistically 
insignificant. 
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increase in the inward FDI-to-GDP share by 0.1 increases backward GVC participation by 
about 0.016 (for reference, GVC_BWI values for most of the countries in the sample fall into 
the range of 0.18-0.52, and inward FDI stock as a share of GDP varies from 0.05 to 0.66). A 
unit-change in the capital intensity variable (the variable varies from 2.0 to 5.2 across the 
sample) induces an increase in backward GVC participation by about 0.05. The marginal 
effect of outward FDI on forward linkages is weaker at 0.08, although one should note that 
forward GVC participation varies in a narrower range of 0.15-0.28. In the case of total GVC 
participation, the impact of FDI variables is slightly stronger and more statistically significant. 
 
The results imply that, at least in the case of backward and total GVC participation, domestic 
capital could work as a substitute for inward FDI at least in promoting downstream 
integration, particularly given that introducing an interaction term between FDI and capital 
intensity yields a statistically significant negative estimate. 
 
We then examine the implications of capital structure for GVC participation. Similar to the 
previous empirical exercises, we estimate separate models for backward, forward and total 
GVC participation (based on gross exports) iterating between inward and outward FDI 
intensity variables (FDI stock as a share of GDP). The conditional marginal effects resulting 
from these estimations are summarised in Table 2.4.4. In the table, the estimations involving 
inward FDI are denoted as model I and those involving outward FDI are denoted as model II. 
As can be seen, while the results are mostly consistent across the two models, specifications 
with outward FDI tend to yield greater statistical significance and higher magnitudes for the 
capital asset type variables. 
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Table 2.4.4. Impact of capital stock by asset types on GVC, country-level results (marginal 
effects) 
Note: The table shows average marginal effects of real capital stock (taken as a share of GDP) by asset types in line with the 
EU KLEMS classification on GVC participation variables. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Columns (I) and (II) indicate alternative fractional probit models associated with the estimates: (I) 
includes inward FDI and (II) includes outward FDI stock as a share of GDP, in addition to other control variables (GDP, 
REER and year fixed effects are used in the baseline). 
 
Capital asset type Code Backward GVC participation Forward GVC participation Total GVC participation 
    (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Total non-residential investment Ocon 0.046** 0.085*** -0.004 -0.013 0.046*** 0.076*** 
Residential structures RStruc 0.074** 0.061 -0.068*** -0.068*** 0.012 -0.003 
Transport equipment TraEq 0.073 -0.010 -0.136 -0.132 -0.031 -0.118 
Other machinery and equipment OMach 0.171* 0.237** 0.074 0.054 0.249*** 0.292*** 
Computing equipment IT 2.473** 3.231*** -1.324* -1.258* 1.264 2.068* 
Communications equipment CT -0.052 0.362 -0.035 -0.016 -0.098 0.337 
Computer software and databases Soft_DB 0.669 1.753** 0.017 -0.077 0.660 1.618** 
Research and development RD 0.337 0.659*** -0.115 -0.132 0.206 0.471*** 
Cultivated assets Cult -0.404 -0.059 -0.262 -0.314 -0.781 -0.446 
Other IPP assets OIPP -2.080** -2.234*** 0.652 0.696 -1.243*** -1.289** 
 
The most prominent result from the aggregate estimations is revealed for computing 
equipment, which yields estimates that are both statistically and economically significant ‒ in 
fact, they are considerably higher than the effects for any other capital asset category. In 
particular, an increase in computing capital stock intensity by 10 pp boosts backward GVC 
participation by at least 0.25, ceteris paribus (for reference, GVC_BWI measure varies 
between 0.17 and 0.52 for the European sample of countries, excluding tax havens). In 
contrast, the impact of computing capital in the case of forward GVC participation is 
negative, albeit only marginally statistically significant. The impact of other machinery and 
equipment capital, oMach, is also significant and manifests itself both in backward GVC and 
total GVC participation measures. The estimates for capital embodied in residential and non-
residential structures turn out significant statistically, but the magnitudes of the economic 
effect is minuscule. 
 
Complementing the evidence from the aggregate country-level analysis, we also run 
estimations for individual sectors. The detailed discussion is available in Adarov and Stehrer 
(2019b). Here we provide a summary of the key results: 
 The textile/clothing sector exhibits a particularly strong across-the-board response to 
FDI and capital formation in terms of both upstream and downstream integration. 
 Outward FDI facilitates forward GVC participation in high-tech manufacturing sectors 
‒ machinery, transport and (especially) electrical equipment. 
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 A significant positive impact of inward FDI on backward GVC participation is found 
in the textile and clothing, agricultural and chemicals sectors. Sizeable marginal 
effects of inward FDI on backward GVC linkages in the high-tech manufacturing are 
not statistically significant. 
 Capital intensity facilitates backward GVC participation. ICT capital is positively 
associated with backward GVC participation, especially for the electrical, transport 
equipment and chemicals sectors. ICT capital appears to negatively impact forward 
GVC participation of the textile and clothing industry. 
 
In summary, the analysis reveals that inward FDI is especially conducive to the formation of 
backward linkages, while outward FDI facilitates forward GVC participation, especially in 
high-tech manufacturing sectors. A particularly robust influence of FDI and capital 
accumulation on GVC integration is identified in the textile and clothing industry. While 
capital accumulation in general intensifies GVC linkages for most sectors, ICT capital appears 
to be especially instrumental for backward integration of the electrical and transport 
equipment sectors.  
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3. Barriers to efficient capital allocation 
Given the empirical results suggesting the importance of FDI and ICT capital, we next 
examine the possible bottlenecks that could be behind the productivity challenges 
distinguishing (i) cross-border investment flows and (ii) capital accumulation with a focus on 
tangible and intangible ICT capital. As a first step we examine the recent and long-run trends 
in FDI, capital accumulation and its composition, taking a comparative perspective. 
3.1. Trends in FDI and capital accumulation 
As discussed in the data section, our analysis employs the FDI data compiled using the 
Eurostat and OECD datasets netting out investment associated with SPEs. We also exclude 
countries that are commonly acknowledged by experts as “tax havens”. This allows us to 
focus on the real economic implications pertinent to FDI conveying a lasting interest by an 
investor in one economy in an enterprise located in another economy. 
 
Figure 3.1.1 shows the dynamics of FDI for the EU in comparison with the global FDI 
intensity and selected economies. The EU is characterised by a much higher FDI intensity 
relative to its peer economies ‒ the US, China, Japan and South Korea in terms of both inward 
and outward FDI-to-GDP ratios. Despite a decline in the volume of FDI in the EU relative to 
2017 (inward FDI stock decreased by 0.2% and outward FDI stock by 5.3%), FDI intensity in 
2018 is high at 54.8% of GDP for inward FDI stock and 60.3% of GDP in the case of outward 
FDI stock. Overall, the post-crisis period has been characterised by a decline in FDI inflows 
for European countries (Figure 3.1.2). 
 
Figure 3.1.1 Inward and outward FDI stocks, 2014-2018 average 
Note: The figure shows the 2014-2018 average for inward and outward FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP for the EU, the 
world economy (WLD) and selected economies. 2014-2017 average for South Korea. 
 
Source: Computations based on OECD FDI database, 2019 
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While aggregate capital intensities vary significantly across European countries (Figure 
3.1.2), in terms of the absolute levels of real capital stock and capital-to-labour ratios, 
European countries generally lag behind their peers (e.g. the US and Japan).  
 
Figure 3.1.2. FDI and capital accumulation before and after the Great Recession 
Note: The figure shows inward FDI stocks and flows, real capital stock growth and real capital-to-labour ratios. 2000-2017 
averages along with the pre-crisis and post-crisis period averages (with and without the double-dip recession period). 
Countries are sorted by ISO3 in alphabetic order. 
Inward FDI stock, share of GDP (ex. tax 
havens) 
FDI inflow, share of GDP (ex. tax havens) 
  
  
Real capital stock, share of employed Real capital stock, year-on-year growth  
  
Source: own computations based on Eurostat, OECD and EU KLEMS 2019 data 
 
Of equal importance is the composition of capital stocks, in particular the share of ICT capital 
and intangible assets, which have recently been seen as important new factors of economic 
growth and productivity. In Figures 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 we outline the share of individual capital 
asset aggregates in total capital stocks and intensities with respect to the labour employed and 
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also examine the changes between the pre- and post-crisis periods (for the countries for which 
the detailed capital asset composition is available in the EU KLEMS 2019). Most of the 
capital stock value (about 90%) is attributed non-ICT capital. In this regard Japan stands out 
from the rest of the sample with a smaller share of non-ICT capital and particularly high 
shares of ICT, SoftDB and RD capital in the total capital stock; however, as a share of 
employed, these capital asset aggregates are in line with other countries. European countries 
exhibit significant heterogeneity in terms of capital composition. While no significant changes 
are observed in the shares of tangible and intangible ICT capital in total capital stocks (there 
is a marginal increase in the share of SoftDB along with a slight decrease in the share of 
tangible ICT in total capital stock), their per-employed intensities have increased notably, 
despite the decline in the real capital stock growth (Figure 3.1.5). Among the European 
countries, Austria, Sweden and Denmark appear to be the leaders at the digital capital frontier 
as measured by the importance of ICT and SoftDB relative to both total capital stock and the 
persons employed (also France for SoftDB, but not tangible ICT). 
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Figure 3.1.3. Composition of capital stocks by asset groups 
Note: The figure shows the share of an asset group in the total capital stock, averages over the period 2000-2006 and 2010-
2016. Countries are listed by ISO3 in alphabetic order. 
  
  
  
Source: Own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019 
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Figure 3.1.4. Capital stocks per person employed by asset groups, USD million 
Note: the figure shows real capital stock per person employed (in USD million) by asset group; averages over the period 
2000-2006 and 2010-2017. Countries are listed by ISO3 in alphabetic order. 
  
  
  
Source: Own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019 data 
 
As a rough assessment of the relationship between capital structure and labour productivity, 
Figure 3.1.6 shows the scatterplots based on the full panel data (country aggregates). 
Although for all capital assets the relationship appears to be positive, it is clear that at least to 
some extent the results are clearly influenced by outlier points, which prompts a careful 
control for outliers in addition to controlling for other factors influencing productivity via a 
robust econometric analysis ‒ discussed in the next section. 
  
 
48 
 
Figure 3.1.5. Capital dynamics by broad asset groups (real capital stocks in log-differences) 
EconComp ICT 
  
  
NonICT OInnProp 
  
  
RD SoftDB 
  
Source: Own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019 data 
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Figure 3.1.6. Scatterplots: labour productivity growth vs growth of capital asset aggregates 
   
   
Source: Own elaboration based on EU KLEMS 2019 data 
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3.2. Barriers to FDI 
The focus of our analysis is FDI that is targeted at real economic activity rather than at capital 
flows associated with holding activities, transfer pricing and tax minimisation activities. The 
literature on the drivers of FDI is quite extensive. As regards the factors that facilitate inward 
FDI, a range of host country-specific characteristics related to the cost of production, 
proximity to large markets, as well as other macroeconomic and regulatory factors has been 
consistently identified in the literature. 
 
Among the most widely known frameworks of FDI is the OLI-framework by Dunning (1993), 
which recognises three types of advantages that attract FDI: ownership (firm-specific 
advantages of the investing firm like technological superiority, marketing and promotion), 
location (country characteristics that make it attractive for FDI) and internalisation advantages 
(the benefits of production by the company itself, rather than outsourcing to another firm). 
Testing the significance of the specific factors empirically, such factors as geographical 
proximity, a common language, economic openness, quality of institutions and infrastructure 
have been commonly identified as relevant for FDI (see Shatz and Venables, 2000; 
Antonakakis and Tondl, 2012; Campos and Kinoshita, 2008; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). The 
cost of production in the host economy, access to natural resources, the cost of labour, human 
capital, access to technology, quality of infrastructure, regulatory quality and strong 
institutions, tax burden, trade openness and macroeconomic stability are also identified as 
relevant factors. Furthermore, the importance of FDI-specific regulatory restrictions is 
reported in Mistura and Roulet (2019), Fournier (2015), Ghosh et al. (2012) and Nicoletti et 
al. (2006). 
 
It is clear that in the context of the EU, both market-seeking and efficiency-seeking motives 
of FDI are relevant, as the EU constitutes the largest market in the world. Significant socio-
economic heterogeneity of the EU countries allows for diverse specialisation patterns in 
different sectors and tasks along global and regional value chains owing to country-specific 
competitive advantages. The general “framework” conditions related to business-cycle 
dynamics and long-run structural characteristics (quality of institutions, infrastructure, human 
capital and other factors directly related to economic competitiveness) are of critical 
importance in facilitating FDI inflows. These factors shape the investment environment in 
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general and are discussed in more detail in the next section, which focuses on impediments to 
ICT investments. 
 
In addition to the general macroeconomic conditions, regulatory frameworks targeting cross-
border capital flows affect the ability of a country to attract FDI. The OECD FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index quantifies the extent to which countries impose barriers to FDI. The 
index measures statutory restrictions on foreign direct investment across 22 economic sectors. 
The discriminatory nature of measures, i.e. when they apply to foreign investors only, is used 
as the central criterion for scoring. Four types of restrictiveness measures are reported on a 0 
(open) to 1 (closed) scale, including: 
I) Foreign equity limitations 
II) Discriminatory screening or approval mechanisms; 
III) Restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel; 
IV) Other operational restrictions, e.g. restrictions on branching and on capital 
repatriation or on land ownership by foreign-owned enterprises. 
 
The overall FDI restrictiveness index is then computed as an average of the sectoral scores. 
Figure 3.2.1 shows the aggregate FDI Restrictiveness Index for the EU countries and selected 
peer economies. As can be seen, the EU is characterised by a rather open investment regime 
relative to its peers. Over the period 2003-2017 the EU average FDI restrictiveness index has 
also declined by about half. At the same time, there is significant heterogeneity across 
European countries. Within the EU, as of 2017, Austria is reported to have the most restrictive 
FDI regime, while the lowest level is observed in Luxembourg, where virtually no obstacles 
to foreign investors are reported. Most EU countries also have a much lower degree of 
regulatory obstacles to FDI compared with the US, Japan and China, with the latter having an 
especially high level of FDI restrictions. 
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Figure 3.2.1. OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 
 
Source: OECD, own calculations 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3.2.2, FDI regulatory restrictions appear to have a strong negative 
effect on FDI inflows. Looking at the specific components of the FDI Restrictiveness Index 
(Figure 3.2.3), the regulatory measures are mostly associated with equity restrictions. Other 
types of restrictions are sizeable only in some countries in the sample (China, Sweden, Japan, 
Belgium and Croatia). 
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Figure 3.2.2 / FDI restrictiveness vs inward FDI 
Panel A. Panel data 
 
Panel B. 2017 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 3.2.3. FDI regulatory restrictiveness by components, 2018 
Note: The legend specifies the following: (I) Foreign equity limitations; (II) Discriminatory screening or approval 
mechanisms; (III) Restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel; (IV) Other operational restrictions on FDI. 
 
Source: OECD 
 
While the importance of a robust macroeconomic framework, strong institutions and a solid 
infrastructure are obvious, the need for statutory restrictions on FDI in the EU is a more 
complicated case. On the one hand, restrictions on inward FDI hinder the benefits the host 
country receives from FDI in the form of additional capital, technology spillovers, 
development of global value chains and job creation. On the other hand, there are concerns 
being voiced over heightened vulnerabilities to external shocks and foreign control over 
strategic European assets that may come with greater inward FDI.11 The latter has become a 
notable source of anxiety for EU policymakers in recent years, particularly with regard to the 
acquisition of EU assets by Chinese companies. This has led to the development of policy 
proposals seeking to introduce screening of FDI in “strategic” sectors. In particular, the 
initiative on the screening of FDI into the EU was presented by the European Commission on 
13 September  2017 and officially entered into force on 10 April 2019.12 The initiative seeks 
to empower EU member states to screen FDI from non-EU countries on the grounds of 
security or public order and to impose mitigating measures or prevent a foreign investor from 
acquiring or taking control of a company. 
 
As the EU is on average relatively open to FDI, according to the FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index, and has been a significant recipient of FDI, these measures, although 
                                           
11 See also European Parliament (2017) for an overview of related issues and FDI screening mechanisms. 
12 See the related documents on https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2088 
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distortionary and protectionist, are justified if applied pragmatically only to the sectors that 
are indeed sensitive from a national security perspective (including ICT sectors, national 
defence, public infrastructure) rather than exploited to provide an unfair advantage to 
domestic companies over foreign competitors. 
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3.3. Barriers to ICT capital accumulation 
In light of our empirical results reported earlier, suggesting that ICT capital (and especially 
intangible ICT) is an important productivity driver, we next discuss the barriers to capital 
accumulation with a focus on ICT capital in the EU context. As has already been noted in 
Section 3.1, the meagre productivity growth in the EU in the post-crisis period relative to past 
historical trends and in comparison with peer economies is related to a lack of investment in 
ICT capital. The insufficient ICT investment in the EU is a rather complex issue in light of the 
high socio-economic heterogeneity of the EU and a multitude of factors that influence the 
efficiency of ICT capital allocation. The variety of these factors could be roughly grouped in 
three broad categories: 
(i) “Framework conditions” that are related to the overall macroeconomic stance of a 
country and broad socio-economic conditions that inhibit investments in general 
(including FDI), which include the business cycle dynamics and long-run 
structural bottlenecks hindering investment in general, e.g. the gaps in institutions 
and infrastructure. 
(ii) ICT investment-specific supply and demand factors that impact the ability or 
incentives of the private sector to engage in ICT investment and impact the 
efficiency of ICT; these include access to finance, labour market inefficiencies and 
other factors complementary to ICT use. 
(iii) ICT-specific regulatory bottlenecks, including regulations that inhibit competition, 
lack of regulatory incentives, and financial and technical support to companies 
investing in ICT. 
 
Besides this, these impediments can also be considered from another perspective. As noted, 
the EU is highly asymmetric in terms of the economic development of its member states and 
has a core-periphery structure with the frontier economies significantly outperforming the 
developing countries in terms of economic development, competitiveness, productivity and 
ICT capital growth. Therefore, these issues are related to (A) the slowing performance of the 
frontier EU economies (Germany and other advanced EU economies as described in Sections 
2.2 and 3.1), and (B) the lack of convergence towards the frontier EU economies by the 
periphery EU countries, which have historically been lagging behind in terms of 
competitiveness and productivity. 
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These factors, however, are intertwined and in many cases mutually reinforcing, and thus the 
relative importance of each one for specific countries is difficult to discern. Below we discuss 
the most important factors from the EU perspective. 
 
 
Macroeconomic environment 
Among the key bottlenecks inhibiting broad-based technological diffusion and the resulting 
productivity gains is the complex interplay between such factors as infrastructure gaps, low 
business dynamism, overregulation in some sectors and countries, the challenges in the 
regulatory and real convergence of the periphery EU countries towards the frontier 
economies, and other impediments for the efficient allocation of capital and labour, along 
with the lack of absorptive capacity by the “follower” firms unable to take advantage of ICT 
investments, digitalisation and technological advances made by the “leader” firms in the same 
industry. 
 
These lasting structural issues have been further aggravated by the recent crisis, and in 
particular the much deeper adverse impact of the global financial crisis and the subsequent 
recession on Europe in comparison with the US. While the latter has recovered relatively 
quickly, the EU has suffered a much more prolonged crisis ‒ in fact, a double-dip recession 
followed by continued stagnant economic growth (see Figure 3.3.1). This has resulted in the 
EU economy suffering greater damage via the hysteresis effects and the lasting losses of 
production capacity (i.e., the decline in potential GDP rather than the transitory business cycle 
shock associated with a “normal” V-shaped economic crisis). The crisis gave rise to the 
political and institutional challenges the EU has been facing, with new challenges posed by 
the rise of anti-integration sentiment, including Brexit, and the resulting uncertainties 
reflecting negatively on forward-looking investment sentiment. 
 
Investment is rather sensitive to business-cycle fluctuations, and in this respect the 
macroeconomic conditions in the EU have been significantly less advantageous in the recent 
decade as a result of the double-dip recession and a lasting lower real GDP growth trend 
relative to the pre-crisis period. Over the period 2010-2019 in terms of real economic growth 
the EU performed worse relative to its peer economies (except for Japan): average real GDP 
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growth in the EU was 1.67%, compared with 2.29% in the US, 3.29% in South Korea and 
7.66% in China. Looking ahead, the expected deep downturn as a result of the COVID-19 
disease will be a major factor hindering investment in general.13 
 
Figure 3.3.1 Real economic growth in the EU relative to peer economies 
Real GDP growth, % Real GDP per capita growth, PPP-adjusted, % 
  
Source: IMF WEO April 2020 
 
 
Intra-EU heterogeneity and real convergence challenges 
As regards the general background framework conditions, as already noted, the EU is highly 
heterogeneous, with a handful of advanced economies that are close to the global productivity 
frontier countries (Germany and other advanced countries) and a large number of countries 
that are on the periphery and experience difficulties with catch-up growth and convergence. 
The latter include the developing/transition economies as well as advanced economies that 
encountered macroeconomic challenges over the past decade (Italy, Greece). Among others, 
the EU countries differ significantly in terms of economic development levels, the quality of 
infrastructure, institutions and other dimensions, which together result in differing levels of 
competitiveness across the EU. The countries that lag behind slow down the progress in ICT 
                                           
13 See also European Commission (2020a) for an outlook of growth and investment prospects in the EU context. 
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investment and utilisation of the EU in general, prompting additional policy action to 
facilitate real economic convergence and internal cohesion.14 
 
As a related problem, the fragmentation of the EU markets still remains a factor that inhibits a 
more effective ICT capital allocation in the EU in comparison with its peers, e.g. the US. 
Despite deep integration already achieved by the EU, a single market in terms of the so-called 
four freedoms, implying free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, is still a “work 
in progress” and bottlenecks remain. This is also related to achieving a single market and 
arriving at a common effective regulatory framework in ICT-relevant areas (e.g. data privacy, 
cybersecurity). Related issues contributing to the de facto fragmentation of the EU market are 
the lack of harmonisation of national standards in the areas not covered by the common EU 
frameworks (e.g. national technical requirements and standards, tax systems, commercial 
dispute resolution frameworks), informal barriers to market entry created by incumbents, 
cross-country language differences hindering ICT use and maintenance, “home bias” in the 
goods and services and labour markets, and other factors.15 
 
The intra-EU heterogeneity in terms of structural background conditions has led to strong 
specialisation trends across the EU countries. These trends, for instance, are evidenced by the 
specialisation patterns in certain sectors within the global value chain networks of EU 
countries (see Figures A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix for the sectoral specialisation patterns as 
regards backward and forward global value chain participation). A case in point is the 
European automotive cluster involving the cross-border production sharing of the German 
automobile industry in Central European countries, which strongly influences their production 
as well as foreign trade and the labour market.16 As countries become locked into certain parts 
of global and regional value chains, the deepening economic specialisation in these sectors 
and tasks determines also the demand for capital inputs, including, inter alia, ICT capital. This 
implies that some countries find themselves in a relatively disadvantaged position, 
specialising in low value-added activities and, as one of the externalities, demanding less ICT 
capital (see also Section 3.1 for a review of the relative ICT capital intensity by sectors). 
While these sectoral specialisation patterns may be optimal for the EU as a whole, for 
                                           
14 See also Bachtler et al, 2017 or Darvas et al, 2019 for a recent review of European cohesion policies and 
challenges. 
15 See also European Commission (2020) for a recent review of barriers to the Single Market as of March 2020. 
16 For additional discussion of GVC participation patterns and implications see Adarov and Stehrer, 2019b, 2020. 
See also Landesmann and Stoellinger (2020) for a policy brief on related industrial policy issues in the EU. 
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individual countries this outcome may not be desirable, and certainly not every country in the 
EU will be able to specialise in knowledge-based industries that are heavy on ICT capital use. 
Economic openness and deeper integration may magnify these cross-country differences. (For 
a broader perspective on the inequality and development risks associated with the 
geographical localisation of value-added activities, e.g. specialisation of low-income countries 
in commodities and low value-added tasks and goods, see, for instance, UNCTAD, 2019.) 
 
Complementary factors of ICT capital accumulation: financial markets 
As noted above, the protracted economic crisis was accompanied by a major investment 
slowdown in the EU and, as a result, unsatisfactory capital deepening across all European 
economies. The decline in the credit supply on account of the crisis was also aggravated by 
less efficient financial markets in comparison to the US, in particular by the “bank bias” in 
Europe (the dominance of the banking sector in financial intermediation, while the capital 
markets remain less developed – see Figure 3.3.2 for a comparative review of the composition 
of financial markets). Lack of diversified financial resources and shallow capital markets have 
been an impediment to boosting investments in the EU in general. 
 
Figure 3.3.2. Composition of financial markets, 2007-2017 average 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database. 
 
Moreover, industries that heavily exploit ICT capital, and particularly knowledge-based 
sectors engaging in extensive innovations, face an additional constraint in the form of the 
inherently higher risks and uncertainty of their investments, as innovative activity is naturally 
prone to higher risks with uncertain returns and possibly longer break-even points. In this 
respect banks may not always be willing to finance such projects because of their higher 
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investment project risk profiles and lack of collateral, and alternative ways of raising funds 
are needed. The bank bias in Europe may therefore hinder access to finance for more risky 
projects that are intensive in ICT capital. The importance of access to finance, particularly in 
the context of intangible capital, is outlined, for instance, in Montresor and Vezzani (2014) 
and OECD (2017). These articles also suggest the development of alternative sources of 
finance as a viable solution to the problem: venture capital, crowd-funding and public-private 
co-financing such as provided in the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI). 
 
Figure 3.3.3. Venture capital investments, % of GDP, 2018 
Note: Japan and Canada – 2017 data. 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Such alternative funding mechanisms are particularly important for innovative start-ups 
intensive in ICT capital. Among the essential factors for such start-ups, besides a research 
base to foster idea generation, entrepreneurial talent and a technically skilled labour force, is 
the availability of initial venture capital. As Figure 3.3.3 indicates, EU countries, including 
frontier EU economies, severely lag behind the US in venture capital investments. Other 
sources of funding for such companies, such as crowdfunding, are also limited in the EU in 
comparison with the US.17 
 
 
 
                                           
17 The issues with the underdeveloped crowdfunding market in the EU relative to major peer economies is 
recognised by the European Commission and there a number of initiatives developed to address the related 
bottlenecks: see the dedicated portal by the European Commission at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/growth-and-investment/financing-investment/crowdfunding_en 
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Complementary factors of ICT capital accumulation: labour markets 
Effective ICT capital utilisation is conditional upon complementary factors that are taken into 
account by firms when planning ICT investments. Among the most important factors for ICT 
is complementary labour, which is needed to make use of ICT capital and enable economic 
value creation. Human capital and workplace organisation are shown to be important for ICT, 
as discussed, for instance, in Black and Lynch, 2004; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Bugamelli and 
Pagano, 2004. There is evidence to suggest that skills mismatch could be another relevant 
bottleneck for effective ICT absorption (OECD, 2015, 2018; Andrews et al. 2018). 
 
Extending these arguments further, the issue can be broken down along several interrelated 
dimensions: the training of ICT specialists, the demand for ICT specialists (supply of relevant 
ICT jobs) and labour market inefficiencies that hinder the effective allocation of workers in 
the EU. As regards the former, the system of higher education in the EU is in general of a 
very high standard, resulting in an adequate supply of ICT specialists, although, when looking 
at the share of the population with training in ICT-related areas, most of the EU countries are 
lagging behind the US (Figure 3.3.4). At the same time Belgium, Ireland, France and Slovakia 
are ranked more highly, with the share of the population with a tertiary education in areas 
such as science, mathematics and computing exceeding 14%. Similarly, when looking at the 
share of ICT graduates in the total number of graduates (Appendix Table A2), one may notice 
a significant heterogeneity across the EU, as countries like Germany and Finland are on par 
with the US, while others (Italy, Portugal) lag significantly behind. In the EU context, 
however, this appears to be a minor issue, as the labour market is sufficiently well integrated 
and skilled ICT labour generally does not face obstacles in finding jobs across the EU. 
  
 
63 
 
Figure 3.3.4. Share of population with tertiary education in the science, mathematics and computing area 
Note: Based on surveys with reference years 2012-2015. 
Source: OECD Educational attainment and labour market outcomes by skills 
 
Apparently, there is high heterogeneity across countries in Europe, and the lack of ICT skills 
and inadequate matching of workers to relevant ICT jobs as a factor for a less than optimal 
technology adoption ‒ and as a result insufficient ICT investment ‒ differs across the EU. In 
general, developing EU countries tend to employ fewer ICT specialists (see Figure 3.3.5) than 
countries such as Finland and Sweden. These patterns, however, are also influenced by the 
specialisation patterns of countries in sectors with varying levels of needed ICT intensity, as 
noted previously. 
 
Figure 3.3.5. Employment of ICT specialists across the economy, 2016, % of total employment 
 
 
Source: OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2017 
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At the same time, the challenge is not only to develop the needed ICT labour force, but also to 
have a supply of sufficiently attractive jobs relative to peer countries and the ability to ensure 
the long-run retention of skilled workers in the EU. Given the higher gross salaries paid in the 
US for high-skilled experts and especially high marginal income tax rates in the EU, the job 
market in the latter remains less competitive than that in the US for skilled labour, ceteris 
paribus. Another measure related more specifically to ICT-intensive labour and tasks is the 
average returns for ICT tasks, measured as a percentage change in hourly wages for a 10% 
increase in the ICT task intensity of jobs (Figure 3.3.6). This shows the clear dominance not 
only of the US but also of South Korea and Japan over the EU countries in marginal monetary 
rewards for ICT tasks. 
 
The literature also suggests that not only ICT specialists are needed as a complementary 
factor for ICT investment, but also adequate managerial capital and organisational skills. 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) and Abramovsky and Griffith (2009) emphasise the latter two as 
important factors for the restructuring of business models towards more competitive ICT-
intensive states. Inefficient management can result in a lack of awareness about the 
effectiveness of ICT capital for productivity growth and competitiveness. This can be further 
aggravated by market inefficiencies and a lack of intensive market competition in 
overregulated sectors or sectors with high market concentration and low business dynamism. 
A related issue is the lack of trust in innovative business models, particularly by SMEs, as a 
result of a lack of knowledge of the ICT market and data privacy concerns in such 
applications as cloud computing, cybersecurity issues, etc. These are closely related to the 
general market competition, business dynamism and related regulations discussed below. 
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Figure 3.3.6. Average returns to ICT tasks, 2017 
Note: Percentage change in hourly wages for a 10% increase in ICT task intensity of jobs (at the country mean) 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
Complementary factors of ICT capital accumulation: market structure, infrastructure and 
other factors 
One of the complementary factors that facilitate further ICT investment is the established 
quality infrastructure that enables the effective use of ICT by businesses. This involves high-
speed broadband connectivity infrastructure, including high-speed mobile broadband. While 
the EU in general is highly developed in terms of the overall ICT infrastructure, the quality 
differs across EU member states. For instance, fixed broadband penetration as measured by 
the number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants differs across the EU countries (Figure 3.3.7). 
While the EU countries are ranked highly in terms of broadband penetration rates relative to 
peer economies, there is room for improvement in many EU countries (including advanced 
economies like Germany and France) with a move to ultrafast broadband access, which is 
needed for businesses operating with large data transfers. 
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Figure 3.3.7. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, per speed tiers, 2019 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Similarly, looking at the relative share of modern high-speed fibre in internet connections 
(Figure 3.3.8), the EU countries lag behind the long-time leaders – South Korea and Japan, 
which have a share of fibre connection exceeding 75%. At the same time, Lithuania, Latvia 
and Spain have been catching up in recent years (OECD attributes this to progress made in 
boosting market competition, better regulation and infrastructure investment). 
 
Figure 3.3.8. Percentage of fibre connections in total fixed broadband, 2019 
 
Source: OECD 
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As regards the general utilisation of basic ICT services in daily business operations (Table 
3.3.1), the EU countries are generally in line with their peer economies, and no strong patterns 
are visible within the EU in terms of the intensity of common uses of ICT capital, e.g. e-mail, 
internet or text processing software. However, when it comes to the more advanced uses of 
ICT technology involving remote data storage and processing (see, for instance, Figure 3.3.9 
for the intensity of the use of cloud computing services), with the exception of the Nordic 
countries European countries were generally lagging behind the US as of 2018. It can be 
conjectured that these observed patterns are the outcome of multiple factors, including those 
discussed in the present report, e.g. sectoral specialisation patterns of countries, perceived and 
real ICT security risks, regulatory gaps and inefficiencies, and relevant complementary labour 
skills. However, the relative importance of these factors remains an open question requiring 
further research. 
 
Figure 3.3.9. Businesses purchasing cloud computing services, 2018, % 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Additional possible issues are related to the dominant market structure in the EU (this, 
however, differs significantly across EU countries and sectors). In the EU, SMEs are 
relatively more important for job creation, whereas in the US employment by big companies 
is dominant. At the same time, bigger firms are much more likely to undertake massive 
investments in ICT capital. As discussed earlier, smaller firms in innovative ICT-intensive 
sectors in the EU ‒ particularly those focusing on financial research and development and 
other risky business activities ‒ besides deficient internal funding sources also face challenges 
with raising external funding as a result of lacking collateral and undeveloped capital markets 
in the EU. The incentives for technology adoption could be weakened as a result of less 
competitive pressures (Decker et al., 2016). Investment in ICT capital is associated with 
strong economies of scale, which contribute to the problem of market concentration and may 
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give rise to a handful of “superstar” MNEs and raise market entry barriers (De Loecker and 
Eeckhout, 2017). 
Table 3.3.1. Frequency of use of information and communications technologies at work 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Regulatory environment 
The quality of the regulatory environment is of high importance for ICT investment. In the 
context of EU the issues are manifold, stemming from overregulation in some business areas, 
lack of regulation or slow legislation and implementation in certain frontier digitalisation-
related areas, and lack of harmonisation in the areas regulated by national standards. The 
issues are, however, well noted and are being addressed; in particular, the importance of 
regulatory and other barriers in the EU market context and possible solutions have been 
pointed out in a recent survey-based report by the European Commission (2020b). 
 
As already noted, one of the risks associated with broader ICT use that eventually translates 
into lower than desired levels of ICT investment by businesses is related to the lack of trust in 
data sharing, cloud services, digital security risks, privacy issues and intellectual property 
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Austria 48 69 80 31 44 58 30 38 53
Czech Republic 25 65 87 30 51 74 20 35 60
Denmark 54 71 85 30 43 62 26 35 57
Estonia 44 58 85 30 46 68 15 23 45
Finland 53 59 86 25 29 54 14 14 39
France 57 64 85 23 28 53 25 30 56
Germany 39 61 80 18 36 52 23 41 57
Greece 20 44 68 18 41 62 5 28 51
Ireland 50 64 79 35 38 59 28 38 60
Italy 55 72 83 37 49 70 26 50 64
Japan 39 42 61 24 31 51 18 18 35
Korea 8 37 62 16 39 62 6 24 46
Lithuania 49 84 39 46 76 27 57
Netherlands 67 79 91 37 46 66 32 47 68
Norway 64 71 89 29 39 56 19 27 55
Poland 29 48 76 18 41 65 26 54
Slovak Republic 16 55 81 23 38 65 38 62
Slovenia 36 67 93 27 50 80 8 33 69
Spain 46 66 80 31 50 65 21 44 59
Sweden 52 69 89 25 36 53 10 27 46
United States 40 61 88 30 43 67 14 30 56
Daily use of e-mail at work Daily use of the Internet at work Daily use of word processors at 
work
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rights (OECD, 2015, 2016; European Commission, 2020b). The EU-wide regulatory 
environment which mitigates these risks is therefore of high importance. 
 
Flexible product market regulations are needed to ensure business dynamism and competition, 
which, in turn, stimulate businesses to seek more effective modes of operation and, among 
others, invest in ICT capital. The importance of increased competitive pressures as a 
necessary stimulus for innovative activity and ICT adoption has been documented in the  
literature (Conway et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2008, Bourles et al., 2010; Andrews and 
Criscuolo, 2013; OECD, 2016b). In particular, as one dimension of this issue, lower entry 
regulations for new businesses, while not desired by incumbent firms, greatly facilitates ICT 
adoption as one of the instruments to maintain a competitive edge in the market. New firms 
typically are more aggressive in trying to find their market niche and expand their market 
share, and therefore tend to employ new technologies more intensively as a means of 
maintaining a competitive edge. Explicit and implicit barriers to a new firm’s entry in the 
form of excessive bureaucratic procedures to register and start new business or activities 
could thus hinder ICT capital investment. On aggregate, as can be seen in Table 3.3.2, in the 
EU on average the costs of starting a new business are relatively high in comparison with peer 
economies in terms of time required to start a business, procedures and costs. Overregulation 
and bureaucracy are also listed in business surveys among the bottlenecks to business 
operation in general.18  
 
While the regulations intend to achieve optimal social outcomes, related inefficiencies in their 
development and actual implementation also increase the costs and delays that hamper the 
development and adoption of new technologies, which is critical for innovative sectors. In the 
EU context the issue is further multiplied by the need for the lengthy coordination and 
approval processes of policy proposals and the different stages of interim evaluation and 
implementation across multiple EU institutions and member states. This puts the EU in a 
relatively disadvantaged position relative to the more dynamic peer frontier economies and 
possibly hinders the competitiveness of EU businesses relative to their peers in highly 
dynamic sectors. 
 
                                           
18 See, for instance, European Commission, 2020; World Banks’s Doing Business surveys, OECD Product Market 
Regulation surveys 
 
70 
 
The need for policies supporting ICT sectors are emphasised in OECD (2019). In particular, it 
is noted that the policies need to be continuously modernised to keep pace with technological 
change. The EU should find the appropriate balance between removing anti-competitive 
product market regulations and effectively enforcing competition law. Excessive market 
regulation by the government inhibits the catch-up process in productivity, hinders 
competition and firm entry and thereby reduces the efficient resource allocation towards more 
productive firms, especially in ICT-using sectors (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003).  
 
Table 3.3.2. Regulatory burden to start a business, 2019 
 Start-up procedures to 
register a business 
(number) 
Time required to start 
a business (days) 
Cost of business start-up 
procedures (% of GNI 
per capita) 
European Union 5.3 11.9 8.1 
United States 6.0 4.2 0.0 
Japan 8.0 11.2 0.0 
South Korea 3.0 8.0 0.0 
China 4.0 8.6 0.0 
Source: World Bank’s WDI, Doing Business 
 
As a related matter, labour market regulations may also have a negative impact on ICT 
investment and the benefits firms can obtain from it. Labour market regulations inhibit the 
possibly more efficient reorganisation of business processes in favour of a greater utilisation 
of ICT capital replacing labour. For instance, Van Reenen et al. (2010) suggest that labour 
market regulations reduce productivity gains from ICT by approximately 45%. One should 
note, however, that while viewed strictly from the business perspective such regulations may 
hinder efficiency and competitiveness, they are still optimal in the aggregate country socio-
economic contexts.  
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4. Policy implications 
The sluggish economic performance of the EU in the post-crisis period, both by international 
standards and relative to its past historical trends, has given a renewed impulse to the debate 
on the drivers of productivity. As discussed in this paper, the issue is two-fold: the across-the-
board slowdown of productivity growth (along with lagging behind peer economies in terms 
of productivity levels) in the frontier EU economies in the post-crisis period, and the 
structural impediments faced by the periphery European economies that led to the slow 
convergence and catch-up of the EU frontier economies. Together, these two issues resulted 
in the overall meagre average productivity dynamics of the EU aggregate. 
 
In light of the important revealed role of ICT capital in accelerating productivity and taking 
into account the impediments discussed in the previous section, the following broad policy 
guidelines appear to be instrumental to facilitate ICT investments: 
- Policies improving the general macroeconomic stability and addressing the structural 
impediments in lagging EU member states as a prerequisite to investment in general. 
- Measures addressing the regulatory bottlenecks that hinder the efficient allocation of 
capital and absorption of ICT capital, including pro-competition policies, measures 
fostering further development of the EU single market along the four freedoms, 
policies regulating ICT-related areas (data privacy, digitalisation, intellectual property, 
technical standards). 
- ICT-targeted policy incentives, including tax incentives, financial support, public 
procurement, provision of public infrastructure and other forms of financial and 
technical support, especially focusing on the support of small and medium-sized 
enterprises and innovative start-up companies, which experience greater difficulties in 
ICT absorption and scaling up in comparison with large multinational corporations. 
- Policies fostering deeper financial markets, and, in particular, advancing further the 
efforts to establish sufficiently deep and efficient capital markets and establishing a 
broad-based environment that facilitates venture capital and other forms of start-up 
financing in ICT-intensive sectors. 
- Policies facilitating the training of a skilled ICT workforce, including both higher 
education and vocational training, as well as addressing regulatory bottlenecks in 
labour markets as regards the skills mismatch, barriers to cross-country labour 
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movements, and adequate incentives to facilitate the retention of a skilled workforce in 
the EU. 
 
Expanding further on the pro-ICT policies, given the importance of financing constraints for 
ICT capital investment, the development of capital markets and special funding instruments 
(venture capital, crowdfunding, etc.) is especially relevant for innovative start-ups that are 
particularly intensive in ICT capital. In this regard, the European Capital Markets Union and 
the Banking Union initiatives and, in general, the further development of sustainable and 
diverse financial markets are highly welcome as a means to finance start-ups and enable the 
scaling up of companies. Overall, this is also important for the more efficient channelling of 
financial capital across EU countries and sectors and fostering overall gross fixed capital 
formation. 
 
In general, the EU’s gross tax burden on both labour and businesses is rather heavy. Along 
with less competitive gross salaries offered for skilled labour force, this translates into lower 
net labour compensation and disposable incomes for skilled labour in the EU, also in the ICT 
sector, thereby potentially making high-skilled jobs in the EU less attractive relative to the 
US. However, ICT-relevant labour supply does not appear to be a major challenge in the EU 
context at present. Focusing specifically on ICT investments and tax incentives, accelerated 
depreciation rates on ICT capital could provide additional incentives to invest in ICT capital. 
Similarly, further efforts to stimulate tax incentives to promote education and training in ICT 
areas ‒ for instance, tax allowances for education or training expenditures ‒ or a tax credit 
against relevant spending or tax exemption may also contribute to ICT absorption and, as a 
result, greater ICT intensity, because skilled ICT specialists are important complementary 
factors, as discussed previously (see also CEDEFOP, 2009). 
 
Pro-competitive regulations and policies aimed at the reduction of barriers to new firm entry 
can provide incentives to adopt new technologies and invest in ICT capital, thereby 
contributing to the development of the necessary start-up ecosystem that may eventually lead 
to an EU equivalent to Silicon Valley. In addition to easing the bottlenecks associated with 
overregulation, firm entry barriers and cross-country regulatory harmonisation, however, this 
requires a massive complementary public infrastructure investment in addition to the policy 
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measures outlined above to remain on a par with similar initiatives in the US or in Asian 
countries. 
 
As noted, addressing the EU regulatory gaps in the area of digitalisation is of great 
importance as well, and given the fast pace of technological progress, delays in the regulatory 
frameworks adversely affect the businesses concerned. In this respect, the Digital Single 
Market strategy in the EU should gain greater momentum. Following the 2014–2019 Digital 
Single Market strategy, on 19 February 2020, the European Commission released further 
documents discussing the envisioned digital regulations in the EU focusing on digitalisation, 
data regulations and artificial intelligence.19 The key idea is to establish Europe as a leader in 
the digital world. 
 
In considering viable options the EU should take advantage of the related strategies 
undertaken in frontier economies that have been successful in boosting ICT diffusion. OECD 
(2019) lists a range of policies that have already been considered and implemented in OECD 
countries. In particular, among the most frequently mentioned policy measures to strengthen 
the ICT sector are subsidies for companies to undertake further investment in infrastructure or 
research and development, or to encourage exports. In addition, direct government funding 
programmes focusing on ICT investment and government-sponsored training programmes are 
also commonly considered as viable policy instruments that enhance the competitiveness of 
domestic firms in the ICT domain. More exotic policy tools include innovative strategies 
focusing on the support of start-ups via business incubators and providing state guarantees to 
start-ups to enable them to access to bank credit. 
 
The EU has been running the risk of falling behind not only the current global leaders in 
digital innovation – the US and Japan ‒ but also the rapidly developing new competitors in 
Asia, particularly China and South Korea. Gaining momentum in digital transformation via 
ICT capital investment may further aid the catching-up process of the lagging EU Member 
States, especially in light of the general purpose technology nature of ICT, and thereby 
improve its internal cohesion and resilience, as well as, more generally, strengthening the trust 
                                           
19 The documents include the “White Paper on Artificial Intelligence A European approach to excellence and 
trust”; “Communication: A European strategy for data”; “Shaping Europe's digital future”. 
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in the transformative power and net benefits the bloc may bring to its members, which has lost 
much steam in the aftermath of the global crisis. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Accelerating productivity growth has been a major challenge in the post-crisis period. It is an 
especially important issue in the context of the feeble economic growth in the EU and is 
increasingly seen by policymakers as a means to foster sustainable long-run economic 
development. The double-dip recession resulted in a deep structural slowdown in the growth 
dynamics. The new, much more profound socio-economic challenges associated with the 
COVID-19 crisis have halted the recovery and obstructed the macroeconomic outlook at least 
in the medium run, hindering, inter alia, investment prospects. At the same time, the new 
challenges have already underscored the importance of digitalisation and ICT capital and will 
clearly prompt further search for more effective and resilient ways to organise economic 
activities and boost economic growth and competitiveness. 
 
Our research has empirically confirmed the important role that ICT capital, both tangible and 
intangible, as well as FDI play in facilitating the competitiveness of modern economies by 
boosting productivity or supporting GVC participation. Consequently, fostering the 
infrastructure that is necessary to facilitate a more efficient allocation of investment with an 
emphasis on ICT capital, both tangible and intangible, thereby facilitating technology 
absorption and digitalisation by the real economy, seems to be a pragmatic way forward in the 
efforts to improve structural conditions. This applies not only to the EU but more generally 
also to both advanced and developing economies. This is even more important given that ICT 
is a general purpose technology, in the sense that it leads to broad-based positive spillover 
effects for the entire economy rather than only benefiting some firms and industries, and that 
it is capable of inducing far-reaching changes in human society, similar to the deep 
transformations that the steam engine and electricity brought in the past. 
 
While not the direct focus of the study, our analysis also supports the important 
transformational impact of EU integration on productivity growth, which may work through 
multiple channels, including regulatory convergence and the upgrading of institutions, co-
funding of infrastructure, and efficiency gains due to a more efficient cross-border 
reallocation of productive resources. This underscores the importance of tackling the 
bottlenecks that still exist in Europe concerning regulatory inefficiencies along with high 
cross-country heterogeneity in the capacity to improve the necessary “framework conditions” 
preventing the effective generation of innovation and adoption of new technologies. 
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Digitalisation represents a significant opportunity for the EU to accelerate its lacklustre 
productivity growth and thereby potentially also its (structural) economic growth. At the same 
time it is clear that it also represents a challenge, given the global nature of competition  and 
the rise of highly competitive peer economies. Today the EU is facing multiple challenges 
associated with geopolitical tensions and unresolved macroeconomic issues, and in terms of 
innovation and digitalisation technology it has already been lagging behind not only the US 
and Japan but also the rapidly developing new competitors from Asia – China and South 
Korea. While Europe seems to have all the necessary ingredients to boost innovation and 
innovation-driven productivity, including a skilled workforce, research infrastructure and 
strong institutions, more efforts are clearly needed to mobilise and channel them into the real 
economy to avoid falling behind its peers in the new era of Industry 4.0. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Classification of sectors 
Note: the table shows the classification of sectors used in the paper with the numerical codes (SEC), corresponding NACE 
Rev. 2 codes, sector full name (based on NACE Rev. 2) and short labels used for the brevity of exposition when discussing 
sectoral estimation results. 
SEC NACE Rev. 2 codes Sector description (based on NACE 2 classification) Label 
1 A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1_AGRI 
2 B Mining and quarrying 2_MING 
3 10-12 Food products, beverages and tobacco 3_FOOD 
4 13-15 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 4_TXTL 
5 16-18 Wood and paper products; printing and reproduction of recorded media 5_WOOD 
6 19 Coke and refined petroleum products 6_COKE 
7 20-21 Chemicals and chemical products 7_CHEM 
8 22-23 Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products 8_RUBB 
9 24-25 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
9_METL 
10 26-27 Electrical and optical equipment 10_ELEC 
11 28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 11_MACH 
12 29-30 Transport equipment 12_TRAN 
13 31-33 
Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment 
13_OMAN 
14 D-E Electricity, gas and water supply 14_GASW 
15 F Construction 15_CONS 
16 45 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
16_TRMO 
17 46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 17_WHTR 
18 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 18_RETR 
19 49-52 Transport and storage 19_TRSR 
20 53 Postal and courier activities 20_POST 
21 I Accommodation and food service activities 21_ACCO 
22 J Information and communication 22_INFO 
23 K Financial and insurance activities 23_FINA 
24 L Real estate activities 24_REAL 
25 M-N 
Professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service 
activities 
25_PROF 
26 O-U Community social and personal services 26_SOCI 
100 TOT Country total 100_TOTL 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure A.1. Backward and forward GVC participation in Europe 
Note: the figure shows the scatterplot of backward GVC participation against forward GVC participation for the sample of 
European countries (excluding tax haven countries) for the period 2000-2014. The data for 2014 is labelled. 
 
Source: own elaboration based on WIOD 2016 release 
 
Figure A.2. Average backward and forward GVC participation of sectors 
Note: the figure shows the scatterplot of backward GVC participation against forward GVC participation for the sectors 
(GVC participation based on gross output), averaged across the sample of countries and the period 2000-2014. 
 
Source: own elaboration based on WIOD 2016 release 
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Figure A.3. Countries and sectors with high GVC participation 
Note: the figure shows the scatterplot of backward GVC participation against forward GVC participation for countries and 
sectors (GVC participation based on gross output), averaged across the sample of countries and the period 2000-2014. High-
tech sectors are highlighted. 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on WIOD 2016 release 
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Table A.2. Share of ICT graduates, 2017 
 B.A. degree M.A. degree 
 share of total 
graduates, % 
persons share of total 
graduates, % 
persons 
Australia 3.3 7,350 6.7 5,803 
Austria 4.4 1,299 3.8 987 
Belgium 2.8 1,822 0.8 310 
Canada 2.3 4,498 3.4 2,113 
Czech Republic 5.3 2,270 4.9 1,617 
Denmark 3.4 1,491 6.7 1,761 
Estonia 7.8 471 6.8 223 
Finland 6.1 2,237 6.6 1,168 
France 3.0 7,867 3.5 10,062 
Germany 5.0 16,461 4.4 9,297 
Greece 2.6 1,299 3.6 616 
Hungary 5.1 1,980 2.6 507 
Iceland 8.1 243 1.0 14 
Ireland 8.4 3,728 7.0 1,491 
Italy 1.3 2,566 0.5 762 
Korea 4.8 17,172 3.0 2,493 
Latvia 4.6 340 4.2 176 
Lithuania 2.9 579 2.3 173 
Luxembourg 3.6 22 2.8 19 
Netherlands 2.7 2,738 2.2 992 
Norway 4.0 1,326 3.6 561 
Poland 3.9 12,836 2.9 5,375 
Portugal 1.3 609 1.1 261 
Slovak Republic 4.3 951 2.6 669 
Slovenia 3.8 337 2.4 123 
Spain 2.5 4,399 1.9 2,519 
Sweden 4.1 1,418 2.0 534 
Switzerland 2.8 1,659 1.6 393 
Turkey 0.2 810 0.6 360 
United Kingdom 4.1 16,800 2.8 6,698 
United States 3.9 76,720 5.2 47,666 
 
Source: OECD 
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Table A.3. Proficiency, use and need of information and communication technologies at work 
Note: based on reference years 2012-2015 
  Manufacturing: 
Use of computer at 
work 
Manufacturing: Moderate 
or complex ICT skills 
required at work 
Manufacturing: Good 
ICT and problem-
solving skills 
Australia 66 41 29 
Austria 72 47 38 
Belgium 74 51 36 
Canada 69 44 32 
Chile 40 18 11 
Czech Republic 58 34 29 
Denmark 86 61 40 
Estonia 49 32 16 
Finland 84 55 42 
Germany 72 46 36 
Greece 46 30 12 
Ireland 69 43 30 
Israel 68 49 29 
Japan 74 49 43 
Korea 60 39 26 
Lithuania 33 23 12 
Netherlands 74 54 38 
New Zealand 71 48 38 
Norway 85 61 36 
Poland 43 28 17 
Slovak Republic 43 28 25 
Slovenia 57 35 17 
Sweden 84 54 42 
Turkey 29 13 9 
United States 77 49 30 
Source: OECD 
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